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Statement of the Problem
Armed struggle is the ultimate option for the overthrow
of an oppressive government. It becomes most appropriate
when all efforts for a political struggle have been
exhausted. Armed struggle became a normal feature in the
white-settler colonies, where peaceful means of struggle
(which included stayaways, strikes, boycotts, petitions, and
peaceful demonstrations), proved futile, and violence, as an
unescapable response to the colonial violence, was
inevitable.
Commenting on the war of liberation, Frantz Fanon, in
his The Wretched of the Earth, said that "national
liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of
nationhood to the people, commonwealth: whatever may be the
headings or the formulas introduced, decolonization is
always a violent phenomenon."’ He says that violence
cannot be escaped in a fight against colonialism because the
two forces involved in that fight—the colonist and the
colonized—have been 'old acquaintances' whose meeting and
coexistence have been marked with excessive violence. Thus,
engaging in a fight with a colonialist does not mean that
the African is just a bloodthirsty animal. Violence is
necessary to ensure total liberation from colonialism, and
’Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Paris:
Presence Africaine, 1963), 35.
all forms of foreign domination.
Amilcar Cabral was to write ten years later, in
agreement with Fanon, that the struggle for national
liberation is a struggle that calls for the resistance of
foreign domination. It is a struggle that protects the
local culture from the aggression of imperialism. In the
Return to the Source. Cabral acknowledges that culture is of
great value to the people's struggle for liberation. As he
puts it, "the value of culture as an element of resistance
lies in the fact that culture is the vigorous manifestation
on the ideological or idealist plane of the physical and
historical reality of the society that is dominated or to be
dominated."^ He stresses that since national liberation is
embedded in the historical right of people to self-
determination, it is the principal task of the national
liberation to reclaim that right from foreign domination.
People everywhere want to be part of the historical
progress, hence the struggle for national liberation is an
important phase to the realization of that reality. It is,
therefore, no accident that African people took up arms.
They wanted to be counted as players in the universal
transformation of humankind. The national liberation
struggle is the gateway towards that end.
^Amilcar Cabral, Return to the Source: Selected
Speeches of Amilcar Cabral (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1973), 41.
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The liberation movements in the white minority
governments in Africa took to arms in the 1960s, The
Angolan armed struggle for instance started as early as
1961, and Guinea-Bissau was to launch its armed campaign the
following year. Two years later, in 1964, Mozambique's
guerrillas infiltrated the country.^
It was also in the 1960s that the liberation movements
in both Zimbabwe and South Africa decided on armed
insurrection. However, in South Africa, armed struggle took
rather too long to be undertaken. All of the liberation
movements in other parts of Africa which engaged the
settler-colonial governments succeeded in claiming their
territories, and Africans there are at least governing (and
even misgoverning) themselves. The South African government
is still intact, thirty-two years after the liberation
movements swore to topple it.
The announcement in 1990 by the African National
Congress of South Africa that it was suspending the armed
struggle, to embark on negotiations for the future of that
country, and the silent compliance of the Pan Africanist
Congress of Azania (SA), is a clear indication that armed
struggle in that country is a fiasco—for the time being, at
least. It is an indirect admission by the two organizations
that they actually did not mean, as it turns out to be, to
^For further reading see Richard Gibson, African
Liberation Movements; Contemporary Struggles Against White
Minority Rule (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).
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involve themselves in violence, regardless of the violence
meted against the Africans in that land by the South African
state machinery. Some may argue, however, that the South
African regime was forced to the negotiating table by the
sabotage activities of guerrilla forces of the two
liberation movements, which to some extent inflicted some
damages on the economy of that country. The study
maintains, however, that the most force came from within the
country than from externally based militants.
This study seeks to examine the evolution of the
national liberation struggle in South Africa, covering the
period between 1960 and 1992, which is the time period
between which guerrilla armed activity has taken place. The
primary emphasis of this study is to investigate the causes
of failure of armed struggle in South Africa. It argues
that there are several factors contributing to the failure
of armed struggle in that country, and no one particular
cause can be singled out as responsible for that failure.
Those factors include the following: Attitude of leaders to
armed struggle; lack of unity; the role of the O.A.U. and
the Frontline States; counter-insurgency measures by the
government; and the lack of bases.
Significance of the Problem
The investigation of the South African liberation
struggle allows us to understand the underlying realities
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that affect the progress of that struggle.
This study has both theoretical and practical
significance. Theoretically, the study contributes to
literature on the history of armed struggle in South Africa.
Practically, the study will help in stimulating further
research of this subject. It also calls the attention of
the leaders of the South African revolution to their
mistakes, so as to correct them and undertake a successful
revolution.
Let it not be misconstrued that the writer suggests
that the revolution in South Africa has failed. Rather, it
is the contention of the writer that it is only strategies
and tactics that failed, and these in turn, perhaps, could
lead to the failure of that revolution.
Questions of the Study
The study raises and attempts to answer the following
questions:
Why is the first country in Africa to form a liberation
movement not yet liberated?
Is the leadership of the liberation movement really
committed to armed confrontation against that government?
Are the African people in South Africa prepared for armed
confrontation?
How much have the leadership of the African political
parties in South Africa learned from other African armed
5
struggles?
These are very important questions of this study and we
will attempt to answer them in chapter four when we deal
with our analysis.
Methodology
The study utilizes historical analysis to explore the
evolution and development of armed struggle in South Africa.
The study will primarily be based on information in
secondary sources, although some primary ones will also be
examined. As such information in books, journals,
magazines, other scholarly articles on the subject, and
newspapers will be relied upon. Books such as Leonard
Thompson and Andrew Prior's South African Politics. T.R.H.
Davenport's South Africa; A Modern History, and Jordan
Ngubane's An African Explains Apartheid, among others, will
be used to provide the historical background of South
Africa's conflict; Gwendolen Carter and Thomas Karis' From
Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of the African
Politics in South Africa. 1882-1964. Francis Meli's A
History of the ANC; South Africa Belongs to Us. Norval
Morgan's Inside the ANC: The Evolution of a Terrorist
Organization. Peter Walshe's The Rise of African Nationalism
in South Africa; The African National Congress 1912-1952.
Edward Feit's Urban Revolt in South Africa 1960-1964; A Case
Study. and Benjamin Pogrund's Sobukwe and Apartheid, will
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provide the account of the African politics in South Africa
and African reaction to foreign domination. Richard
Gibson's African Liberation Movements. Kenneth Grundy's
Guerrilla Struggle in Africa; Analysis and Preview, and
journals such as Africa Research Bulletin. Journal of Modern
African Studies and Race Relations Survey, and periodicals
such as The Africa Communist, and Africa Report, and
newspapers such as the New York Times, will be used in
analyzing the exile activities of the movements and current
events, respectively.
The advantage of this method is that using these
different sources of information, especially in a study such
as this—where the information in primary sources could be
skewed due to propaganda—is that the data could be
' corroborated'. Commenting on the use of varied sources,
Earl Barbie has pointed out that they might build the
researcher's confidence if they "point to the same set of
'facts'...", warning that there might be bias in data
sources dealing with the "development of a political
movement" when the data is "taken from the movement
itself
The use of unobtrusive methods such as the one used in
this study is also a way to avoid unbalanced ideas from
members of the liberation movements—had the writer decided
^Earl Barbie, The Practice of Social Research (Belmont,
California; Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1986), 294.
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on conducting interviews. Some members might even have been
reluctant to part with the needed information, in the name
of security, since to some this may be a topic which could
be said to be sensitive.
Literature Review
Literature on armed struggle abounds. It comes under
different names such as revolution, national liberation,
violent solution, armed conflict, and so forth. For the
purpose of this study the writer attempts to review and
critique the existing literature on armed struggle and
revolution so as to clarify the major theoretical issues on
the subject. We will also look closely at the significance
of the literature and what contributions some writers have
made to the understanding of the topic.
The political history of South Africa has been
documented by many writers. Many writers still have
followed closely the political consciousness of the Africans
in that country. The most outstanding of these writers are
Thomas Karis and Gwendolen Carter who have been able to
compile three of four volumes in which they give the
beginning of the early resistance and attempts made to the
formation of African political movements. They give an
elaborate historical development of the liberation movement
and the problems it encountered during the formative years.
These two writers have gathered first hand information from
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different leaders of the liberation movement. They also
were able, through their research, to establish the
conditions that precipitated armed struggle.
From Protest to Challenge; A Documentary History of the
African Politics in South Africa. 1882-1964. which is a
collective name for the four volumes, is an important
reference material for a detailed background to the
liberation movement in South Africa.
Included among other books relevant to South African
politics are Leonard Thompson and Andrew Prior's South
African Politics. J.H. and R.E. Simons' Class and Colour in
South Africa 1850-1950. and Mary Benson's South Africa; The
Struggle for a Birthright.
Richard Gibson's Africa's Liberation Movements is an
account of some of the major movements that made and that
purport to make history during the anti-colonial struggles
in Africa. The book relates the power struggles in the
liberation movements due to lack of organization and unity.
Gibson follows up with the analysis of the political life of
these movements, the psychological conditions of the
militarily trained personnel and the division among them,
and their situation in the military camps.
Richard Gibson's discussion of the reception of the
guerrillas in the host countries, sheds light on how the
guerrillas, because of the existing conditions there,
planned to go about their activities.
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He concludes that the PAG, if well organized, because
of its political outlook, is the only national liberation
movement in South Africa that could bring about genuine
political change.
An African Explains Apartheid by Jordan K. Ngubane
discusses the underground movements that were organized
after the banning of the liberation movements in South
Africa. He divides the underground groups into five
categories. These groups are the heroic wing of African
nationalism, the realists, the communists, the Trotskyites,
and the uncommitted Africans. The heroic group consists
mainly of the militant and nationalistic portion of the
African community, the largest group comprising former PAG
members. This category has a strong appeal to the African
masses.
The realists are made up of moderate traditionalists,
socialists, multi-racialists, businessmen, church leaders,
intellectuals and workers. It is a better organized
underground group. Most of the membership is from the ANG.
It does not have a clearly defined strategy of African
nationalism.
The Gommunists went underground as soon as they were
banned. This group was never effective because its
membership was scanty. It usually worked behind the scenes
using the African political movements for its own goals. It
concerned itself with tactical considerations, having strong
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connections with the Soviet Union. They were not supportive
of the tradition of struggle.
The Trotskyites have never been able to get support
from the broad masses of people. The group was composed of
Africans and whites who have been in the armed forces of the
South African army. They had arms and money, and wanted to
recruit Africans for military training.
The uncommitted group does not have a recognizable
structure of organization. It is the oldest in South
Africa. The members could sympathize with any of the
African political movements. This could be the group that
organizes such activities as bus boycotts and strikes. It
is the real underground.
With this background, Ngubane made it possible for any
researcher on South African liberation struggle to have a
vivid understanding of the groups actually involved in that
struggle.
Kenneth Grundy's Guerrilla Struggle in Africa; An
Analysis and Preview examines all the liberation movements
in Africa and places each one of them within a specific
category he calls a typology, to facilitate comparison
between individual movements. To arrive at this typology he
bases his analysis on four variables, namely, a) the
government the guerrillas would like to topple, b) the type
of government they seek to introduce, c) who they recruit,
and d) the techniques the movements use to meet their goals.
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Accordingly, Grundy places the South African liberation
movements under the National-Modern category because the
final objective of these movements is to establish an
African majority rule.^
He observed that while conditions for armed struggle
existed in South Africa, the movements have not made an
effort to break their dependency on outside support, and he
is also critical of their recruiting methods.^
Edward Feit's Urban Revolt in South Africa. 1960-1964
is a detailed account of urban guerrilla warfare in South
Africa, scrutinizing the organization of uprising 'in the
cities and towns' and especially the early stages of the
revolt including the recruitment, training, and so forth.
Feit continues to give reasons why Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear
of the Nation) chose sabotage as the main tactic for
achieving its political goal. He further analyzes the
problems that led to the failure of that tactic during the
sixties, also dealing with the conflict that arose among the
cadres of Um]chonto.
Edward Feit's conclusion, among other things, is that
"once an insurgency begins to fail, it goes from failure to
^Kenneth W. Grundy, Guerrilla Struggle in Africa; An




failure."^ While this contention could be challenged, it
seems true in the case of the liberation struggle in South
Africa.
Among the more recent works is Francis Meli's account
on the ANC in South Africa Belongs to Us: A History of the
ANC. As the subtitle says, Meli relates an insider's
history of the ANC and its position in the changing
political situation in South Africa.
Following in Meli's footsteps is Morgan Norval who
follows the ANC into exile and to the point where it opts to
go to the table after the release from jail of Nelson
Mandela. In his Inside the ANC Norval exposes the power
struggles and the divisions created by the question of
having talks with the South African ruling Nationalist
Party.
The themes discussed in the literature are
characteristic of the factors which this study addresses.
Together they make up the body of the thesis of this study.
The idea of this study is to show that the success of armed
struggle depends on many factors, some of which are
presented in the literature examined.
These themes—disunity, counter-insurgency measures by
the government, organization of the movements, the attitude
of leaders, the attitude of the O.A.U. and the Frontline
^Edward Feit, Urban Revolt in South Africa 1960-1964; A
Case Study (Massachusetts: Northwestern University Press,
1971), 321.
13
States, and the question of logistical support—which were
mentioned in passing, will be given detailed treatment.
Our study contributes to the body of literature that
deals with the failure of armed struggle in reference to
South Africa.
Theoretical and Conceptual frameworic
There could be many theories related to armed
revolutionary struggle, but many writers have repeatedly
identified three which are commonly used. The following
represent the theories: the Maoist theory, the "Che” Guevara
theory, and the Urban guerrilla warfare theory. Almost all
the revolutions that have taken place since the 1917
revolution have used one or the other of the theories of
armed struggle, or even a combination of two.
The Chinese Revolution has proved that a successful
armed struggle calls for the total reliance on the masses.
This is actually the basis for the war of liberation as the
war itself should end up being fought by the masses
themselves. The revolutionaries can mingle with the masses
and be protected by them.
Mao's strategy of educating the masses and creating
favorable bases for the revolution has advantages. He
emphasized that political mobilization is a precondition to
a great revolution and this needs to be taken seriously.
Without political mobilization, there can be no success of
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revolution. "To wish for victory and yet neglect political
mobilization", he says, "is like wishing to 'go south by
driving the chariot north', and the result would inevitably
be to forfeit victory".® In the same breath, Mao stressed
that while there is need for political organization in an
armed struggle, military power must be the first to be
established. He said that the masses will only be
politically involved as soon as the fighters had set example
for the masses, for political mobilization will continue as
long as the fighting goes on. As he puts it, the
revolutionaries fight
...not merely for the sake of fighting,
but to agitate the masses, to organize
them, to arm them, and to help them
establish revolutionary political
power....’
He concludes that should the military establishment
fail to achieve the said objectives, then it will make no
point for the revolutionaries to continue fighting, and that
the revolutionaries would not deserve to exist.
The Vietnamese Revolution drew greatly from the Chinese
experience. Revolution leaders like Ho Chi Minh and Vo
Nguyen Giap, while appreciating Mao's strategies of war,
differed slightly with his conduct of war. For instance. Ho
®Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings (Peking:
Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 228.
’idem, "On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the
Party," Selected works Vol. 1, (London: Lawrence and
Wishart, 1954), 106.
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Chi Minh thought that the political work should take
precedence over military activity. He said that the
political propaganda machinery should be organized so that
when fighting starts the masses would be politically
conscious.
Another theory emerged from the experience of the Cuban
Revolution. Ernesto "Che” Guevara, contrary to what the
Maoist theory preaches, said that the revolution could start
even before the masses were given political education and
organization. His idea of an uprising was that the masses
could join in automatically after the battle had been
started. He argued that the conditions for a revolution
were going to be created by the fighting itself, that it was
"not necessary to wait until all conditions for making
revolution exist; the insurrection can create them."”
Guevara had confidence in the Cuban guerrillas. As few in
number as they were, he maintained that military power be
created around them. "Che" agrees with Mao in regards to
the importance of the masses and the strategic nature of the
countryside. He acknowledges the idea that the masses are
the driving force in any revolution, while at the same time
saying that little contact should be maintained between the
^°Ho Chi Minh, Selected Works (Hanoi: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1961), 155-156.
^Ernesto Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (NY: Monthly
Review Press, 1961), 15.
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masses and the guerrillas.
Che Guevara's theory was echoed by Regis Debray who
wrote in his Revolution in the Revolution?... that guerrilla
fighters should have minimal contact with the masses.
Debray maintains that the political education must be
preceded by the military activities. He argues that
political preparation of the masses can be effective only
when inculcated within the war itself. Any political
organization should emanate from the guerrilla nucleus which
he calls the foco, a 'mobile strategic force' which the
guerrilla movement itself must create.It is the brain
of the liberation struggle.
With the foco thus established, all activity will be
dictated by its strength. After the military foco had been
established, according to Debray's theory then,
...the unifying factors are the war and
its immediate political objectives...
The most decisive political choice is
membership in the guerrilla forces, in
the Armed Forces of Liberation. Thus
gradually this small army creates rank-
and-file unity among all parties, as it
grows and wins its first
victories. ...
In this way the masses do not have control of their own
liberation, and this can cause problems of isolation between
the masses and the guerrillas. In this kind of situation
^^Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution? Armed
Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America (NY:
Monthly Review Press, 1967), 22.
^^Ibid., 105.
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hostilities may arise between the two groups, as a result.
This Debray ignores and says that one of the ideas of the
foco is to protect the guerrillas, hence peasants were not
informed of the intentions of the fighters.
Bard E. O'Neill quotes Carlos Marighella as having said
that urban guerrilla warfare exploits the existing political
crisis and turns it "into armed conflict by performing
violent actions that will force those in power to transform
I
the political situation of the country into a military
situation.This strategy takes a completely
different face from the Chinese and the Cuban strategies.
It emphasizes organization, propaganda and extensive
terrorism. The strategy is popular with such groups as the
Irish Revolutionary Army (IRA), which is fighting against
British colonization of Ireland.
So far urban guerrilla warfare has proved to have
advantage in having the guerrillas hide their identity for a
long time. This strategy causes and exploits the political
confusion that exists in a country at a particular point in
time. It probably could be successful only if the fighters
want certain concessions within the government; it is rather
a futile tool if the ultimate objective of the guerrillas is
to have a completely new government.
^^Carlos Marighella, quoted in Bard E. O'Neill, Armed
Struggle in Palestine; A Political-Military Analysis
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), 41.
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The disadvantage with this strategy is that the
fighters who start the spark may find themselves fighting
alone, isolated. Enemy propaganda against them may be
strong. It cannot succeed on its own. That is why the
urban guerrilla groups do not last long.
With his seventeen year experience as leader of the
Guinean revolution, Amilcar Cabral should qualify as the
first of theoreticians ever to emerge from Africa. The mere
fact that he could take the two theories that emerged from
the Chinese and the Vietnamese experiences, and adapt them
for the revolution, makes Cabral a leading theorist of armed
struggle. In his observations he concluded that the
military and the political wings cannot be, and should not
be separable, that, in fact, military supremacy was never
thought of. He says in Revolution in Guinea that
the political and military leadership of
the struggle is one: the political
leadership. In our struggle we have
avoided the creation of anything
military. We are political people, and
our Party, a political organization,
leads the struggle in the civilian
political, administrative, technical,
and therefore, also military spheres.
Our fighters are defined as armed
activists. It is the Political Bureau
of the Party that directs the armed
struggle and the life of both the
liberated and unliberated regions where
we have our activists.
’^Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea: Selected Texts
by Amilcar Cabral (New York: Monthly Press Review, 1969),
146.
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Cabral's theory is a great contribution in as far as the
strategies of war in Africa are concerned, and it certainly
has been a source of reference to many revolutions.
Frantz Fanon's account of the Algerian Revolution, and
his contribution of the theory of violence during an anti¬
colonial war, place him at the same level with Amilcar
Cabral. Many leaders of revolution in Africa need to
utilize Fanon's invaluable book. The Wretched of the Earth.
Kwame Nkrumah's Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare; A
Guide to the African Revolution also comes in handy as a
guide to successful revolutionary war. It is a collection
of techniques and tactics of revolution.
Having examined the different theories of revolutionary
war, we found that people's war as perceived by the Chinese
theorists is quite attractive. The theory is a well-thought
of idea as opposed to, say, the foco theory of the Caribbean
revolutionaries.
Theoretical issues the study focuses upon include
national liberation, national revolution violence, armed
struggle, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, revolutionary war,
people's war and protracted war. Concepts utilized in this
study include such themes as settler-colonialism,
Herenvolkism, racism, Afrikaner nationalism, multiracialism,
African Nationalism, and Pan-Africanism.
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Organizational Structure
The first chapter will introduce and state the nature
of the problem. That is, it sets the stage for the
research. It also discusses the method used by this study,
the literature related to this study and the theoretical
concerns of this study.
The second chapter will discuss the historical
background, and laying down as it does the preconditions to
the conflict in South Africa. Further, the chapter will
discuss the formation of the liberation movement in South
Africa. It will also outline the initial aims and
objectives of the different political parties and the
differences that led to their divisions.
Chapter three will concern itself with the decisions
taken by the liberation movements to resort to armed
struggle, and the problems encountered during their
formation. It will also analyze their activities inside the
country until these activities were curbed by the state and
the liberation movements were forced into exile. This
chapter will also describe the exile activities of these
movements.
The fourth chapter will analyze the factors that
contribute to failure by these movements to launch a
successful campaign against South Africa. Their strategies
and tactics, and their applications to the revolution in
South Africa will be considered here.
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The fifth chapter will reflect on the present political
situation in South Africa to find out if the prospects for a
revolutionary change are at hand in the near future.
The sixth chapter, which is the concluding chapter,





Some historians have claimed over the years that the
ancestors of the Africans who are in what is today called
South Africa and those of the Boers arrived in that land at
the same time. This claim could not be readily verified by
the claimants who say that by the time the Europeans reached
the Cape the Africans were coming into the land from the
North. Leonard Thompson and Andrew Prior, two of few
historians who did extensive research on the history of
South Africa, have determined that the ancestors of the
African population there began to settle in South Africa as
early as A.D. 300.^ Recent archaeological evidence reveals
that the BANTU speakers have had a great civilization going
on long before the Europeans even dreamt of South Africa's
existence. As Christopher Saunders records it, the early
inhabitants of South Africa have engaged in iron-casting
culture and were also involved in pottery and farming as
early as the first millennium A.D.^
According to T.R.H. Davenport "radio-carbon dating has
provided evidence of negroid iron-age settlement in the
^Leonard M. Thompson and Andrew Prior, South African
Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), xi.
^Christopher Saunders, Historical Dictionary of South
Africa (London: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1983), 87.
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Transvaal as early as the 5th century".^ Archaeologists
have also revealed in 1981 that the area around Pretoria has
remains of buried huts dating back to the same period.
By around 1300 the Nguni people (Xhosa, Fengu, Mpondo,
Zulu, Swazi, and the TheThwa) had established themselves
around the Khwahlamba (Drakensberg range of mountains).
In the final analysis the disagreement, or agreement,
on the subject of who between the Europeans and the Africans
first set their foot on the South African soil is now a
closed chapter because historians now begin to accept the
fact that the history of South Africa does not begin when
the Europeans set eyes on that land. Besides, the settler
colonists themselves now admit that Africa belongs to the
Africans, and that they feared for their lives should the
country be under majority rule. The above background merely
affirms that position.
As we can see, the history of that part of the world
takes us deep into the centuries. This information helps
this study because taking a long term background to the
conflict in South Africa will help us understand clearly
what is at stake in that country, because that is what the
study of history is all about.
The arrival of the Europeans in South Africa is
documented in many history books. Among the first European
^T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa; A Modern History
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 5.
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explorers who had contact with the Africans were the
Portuguese. In 1488 under Bartholomeu Diaz, it is said, the
Portuguese did not bother going to the South African shores.
They saw the people from afar, and what they did was to
report what they saw to their company, and soon all Europe
knew about the place because South Africa was important as a
route to the East. In 1497 Vasco da Gama's men reported on
the indigenous inhabitants along the South African coast
land. Several authors, including Edward Roux, and
T.R.H.Davenport, give an elaborate account of this history.
In the 1600s the Dutch had out-competed most countries
which were looking for adventure in the East Indies. On
April 6, 1652 Jan van Riebeeck, leader of a crew under the
Dutch East India Company (D.E.I.C.), landed at the Cape.
Immediately upon arrival these Dutch men and women
established a refreshment station and a military post for
the defense of the shore land they had interest in. This
establishment was clearly a creation of a small white
settler separate colony on African land, without even
consulting the Africans. This caused friction between
Africans and van Riebeeck's men, and in 1653 the Africans
"made a bold bid to stop white encroachments on their
land."^ This confrontation between the Europeans and the
Africans was to continue, and it set the pace of South
^Jordan K. Ngubane, An African Explains Apartheid (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), 5.
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African politics. In 1659 another clash between these two
groups ensued which involved the further encroachment by
these Europeans, an encroachment during which they stole
livestock from the QhoiQhoi. Such clashes were to be
experienced throughout the centuries, and they marked the
deep-seated hatred that now exists between the African and
European peoples, and hence the subsequent political and
economic segregation.
There were several changes at the early stages of
European settlement in the Cape. In 1657 Jan van Riebeeck's
men retired from their duties as the D.E.I.C.'s servants,
and since they were free men they came to be known as Free
Burghers. And now that they were no more dependent on the
Company, they decided to settle in the Cape and cultivate
wheat and vegetables, meaning that their demand for land
grew. At the same time, since they retired from the
company's duties, the company suffered loss of manpower so
that it decided to import slaves from Mozambique, Angola,
Ceylon, Malagasy (then Madagascar), and Indonesia.^ It was
necessary for Jan van Riebeeck to get slaves from these
foreign lands because the local inhabitants refused to work
for these prospective colonists. These slaves were to work
for the settlers until the abolition of slavery in 1834.
^Francis Meli, A History of the ANC; South Africa
Belongs to Us (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1989),
xiii.
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It became apparent that the Dutch were taking the
African land when in 1660 Jan van Riebeeck and his men
fenced themselves in a segregated colony. This idea did not
hold for long for, when the French Huguenots arrived in
1688, more land was desired, and hence the pressure to
acquire it was intensified. Thus by 1700 the Europeans had
taken much of African land and livestock.
Coupled with the usurpation of African land and
livestock underway, and the African communities intimidated
by the sophisticated arms that the Dutch used against them,
was the introduction of a system of control. In 1760 the
Dutch introduced the 'pass laws' to monitor the labor and
movement of slaves. At this time the Cape population was
living under Dutch culture which was diluted by the other
cultures of the African communities and the French
Huguenots. These pass laws, which were reinforced in 1809
by the British governor of the Cape when he "introduced a
proclamation requiring the Khoikhoin to carry passes when
moving from one area to another," and were since then
"extended to other regions of the country,"^ were to be in
place until in the 1980s when they were relaxed.
But over the years the pass laws had been to the
Africans a constant reminder of their oppression. Hence
they staged relentless resistance against the passes.
^Bernard M. Magubane, The Political Economy of Race and
Class in South Africa (New York and London: Monthly Review
Press, 1979), 133.
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Another major change came when the British came to the
Cape and took over the administrative responsibilities from
the Dutch-a change that later led to conflict between the
two European groups, as we shall learn below.
The British-Boer War and Alliance
The first British occupation of the Cape was in 1795
during which the British wanted to protect the route to the
east Indies from other European competitors, especially the
French with whom the British were at war. The Cape colony
was given back to the Batavian government (the Dutch
authorities) in 1803 when the British were satisfied that
the territory and the strategic sea routes to India were
safe from other European adventurers.
In 1806 the British annexed the colony for the second
time and made a few adjustments in the governance of the
region. Apart from changing the mode of production of the
Cape Province, they wanted to change the prevailing
political set-up established by the 'Afrikaners.' This the
British made clear in a Cape Ordinance 50 of 1828 which also
outlawed the pass laws and other restrictions on freedom of
movement. The British also sought to introduce liberal
treatment of the African inhabitants so as to extend equal
rights to the Africans. Equal rights meant that the
Africans would also occupy as much land as the Dutch.
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Following the Cape Ordinance was the 1832 emancipation
of slaves all throughout the British empire. It was in the
interest of the Cape government to have a freer labor
market. The British had wished to establish conditions for
the growth of commerce at the Cape, and hence by 1870 export
trade in wool had developed greatly.
The Dutch resented this British rule because "it
interfered with their way of life when it extended legal
rights" to the Africans, thus releasing them from servitude
under the Dutch.^ They opposed the British idea of equal
rights saying that Africans were inferior beings. Equality
with Africans, they said, was an insult to the Afrikanerdom
ideology, Herenvolkism, which they inculcated as part of
their belief system when they established their republics.
This ideology holds that the 'Afrikaners' are the chosen
people of God, and had God-ordained powers to rule over the
Africans who they regarded as almost non-beings.
Besides, the Dutch felt that the British wanted to
subject them to British rule, which rule they had always
detested.
For the Dutch to be free from this British
incorporation in the British kingdom they had to move
forward into the hinterland where they could establish their
own political and social culture as one Dutch people.
^Stanley Chodrow, H.W. Gatzke, and C. Schirokauer, A
History of the World (NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
Publishers, 1986), 822.
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Between 1836 and 1854 the Dutch settlers started a
massive exodus which later came to be known as the Great
Trek. They decided to leave the Cape to the English people
to establish their own colonies in the hinterland where
political participation was exclusively for Afrikaners.
Having established the two colonies of the Orange Free
State and the Transvaal, where both diamonds and gold were
discovered in 1864 and 1884 respectively, the Afrikaners
felt that they had nothing more to do with the British since
they were far from 'their' territories. But in 1895 the
British raided the Boer territories when the president of
the Transvaal, Paul Kruger, "placed heavy restrictions on
British immigrants... to discourage..." the British from
coming into the Afrikaner regions.® This tension between
these two tribes of Europe led to what came to be known as
the Anglo-Boer War, the Boer War or simply the South African
War, in 1899, and which ended with the defeat of the Boers
in 1902, and the republics finally became part of the
British empire.
However, in less than a decade the Afrikaners emerged
victorious when on May 31, 1910 both the British and the
Dutch inaugurated the Union of South Africa, and were given




The Union of South Africa
The Union was nothing else but a furthering of African
colonization. While the Boers were granted the
administrative responsibilities, and a chance to formulate
the power structure of white supremacy, the British
maintained the economic infra-structural power.
As its first task the Union parliament enacted the 1913
Land Act which alienated the Africans. According to
Magubane,
Africans could only acquire land or
interest in land outside of the
scheduled African areas from other
Africans, unless they had the consent of
the governor-general; concomitantly,
only Africans could acquire land or
interest in any land or interest in any
land within a scheduled area, unless the
owner had the approval of the governor-
general . ’
In addition the act prohibited those Africans who had
plows and oxen to use 'white land' in return for giving the
'white owner' half of the harvest. The Africans had nowhere
to reside but the reserved lands where they could be
imported as free labor. In this way the farmers and the
miners could get a constant flow of cheap labor.
In short, the Union of South Africa was a transference
of political power by the British to the Dutch. It gave the
Dutch complete control over the territory and its people.
Under the Afrikaners, Africans lived under stringent laws
’Magubane, 81.
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which allowed the Afrikaners to treat them as non-citizens.
Thus the period between the tenure of the Union
parliament and the victory of the Nationalist Party in 1948,
was one punctuated by a string of laws which were meant to
cut the Africans to size. These laws included the Native
Affairs Act (1920) which disenfranchised the Cape Africans;
the Native Taxation Act (1922) forced all African males
between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five to pay an annual
poll tax; the Urban Areas Act (1923) prohibited Africans
from buying land in the Urban areas and could not be granted
same privileges as white urbanites; and the Native
Administration Act (1927) put the Africans under the
authority of the governor-general and other white officials
in the Native Affairs Department.
The Union Act, in this way, was nothing but a clear
ordination of the apartheid laws.
The Rise of African Political Consciousness
The Hundred Years War(1806-1906)
Before we embark on the modern African political
organization, it is fitting to note that the conquest of the
Africans was not just a walk-over. For a period of hundred
years, between 1806 and 1906, Africans engaged the British
and the Dutch in a series of wars. These wars were against
both of these European groups because each of them wanted to
^°Ibid., 83-84.
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subject the Africans to a different brand of enslavement.
While the Dutch were more interested in farming and animal
husbandry, the British were interested in modern capitalism
reducing the Africans, therefore, "to the most degrading
wage bondage in the modern world.... This came at a
time when the British had lost their American colonies.
Different ethnic groups fought separately, hence in the
long run it was evident that their so doing weakened their
position as a fighting force. Having defeated the Xhosas in
the Cape, the British decided to go into the interior. But
by the time they reached Natal, King Shaka of the Zulu
people had unified "the Zulu principalities into a
formidable state..." and his kingdom "was about to unite the
whole of South Africa under one rule."^^ The problem with
these Shaka wars, known as the 'Mfecane' in Nguni, and
'Difaqane' in Sotho, was that Shaka did not notify the other
communities of his strategies. His regiments just invaded,
captured, and incorporated strong captured males into the
Zulu armies, and women and children became part of the
empire.
King Shaka could not see the completion of his mission
for in 1828 he was killed by his brother Dingane who took




The African communities of South Africa had lived in
isolated, far-apart areas. This was a disadvantage
especially during a time when communication was still
ancient. It took days for a messenger to reach his
destination. At times he would fall among hostile people
even before he made it to the assigned destination. For
instance, for a Zulu messenger to get to the Northern
Transvaal, he would encounter the Swazis, the Hlubis, the
Ndebeles, and the Sotho, who were enemies with the Zulus.
Thus, by the time the colonial invaders reached the
interior of the country the other communities were not
prepared for war. However, fierce resistance was staged by
the Pedi and the Ndebele people who had inhabited the
Transvaal area against the 'trekboere' who eventually
conquered them in the 1850s.
The last of the hundred years wars was the Bambatha
rebellion in 1906, in Natal. The uprising was suppressed in
1907.
Modern Political Organization of Africans
The first African political organization was Imbumba ya
Ma Afrika (Union of Africans) formed in 1882. Organized by
journalists in Natal, the southeastern region of the
country, Imbumaba could not reach other African groups in
the North—a factor that contributed to the downfall of the
movement. Although short-lived at an early stage of its
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development, the Imbvunba influenced people like John Tengo
Jabavu who founded "Imvo Zabantsundu” (Native Opinion)a
newspaper through which he challenged discriminatory
measures that the anti-African Dutch had established.
The formation of the South African Native National
Congress (SANNC) in 1912, which became the African National
Congress of South Africa (ANC) in the 1920s, marked the turn
of events in South Africa. This organization, formed by
gentlemen from British missionary schools—priests,
teachers, lawyers, doctors—and tribal leaders, was
determined to be the mouthpiece of the African people. The
advantage of this organization was that it included all
provinces in South Africa, and therefore had superiority
over those that preceded it.
As a new organization the ANC was faced with difficult
tasks. Having set its immediate goal as the unity of the
Africans, it had to prove itself able by challenging the
Land Act which was promulgated within only a year of its
existence. ANC sent out a delegation to make the government
aware of the African objections. A letter was written to
the British Governor-General of South Africa, Lord
Gladstone, "asking him not to agree to the Bill until he had
^^Gwendolen M. Carter and Karis Thomas, eds. From
Protest to Challenge:A Documentary History of African
Politics in South Africa,1882-1964 Vol. 1 (Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1972), 4.
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heard the African view."^’ When Lord Gladstone refused to
give audience to their request, the ANC sent a deputation to
Britain, for they reasoned that since South Africa was a
British colony, the King would be sympathetic to their
cause. This too did not work.
But this moderate approach of the ANC saw the
organization becoming ineffective, a decline from which it
was to recover in the 1940s.
This temporary, but almost damaging, decline of the ANC
came as a result of the 1919 formation of the Industrial and
Commercial Union (ICU) which, immediately after its
formation, organized African and Coloured workers to strike;
this strike action was repeated in 1920 by African miners in
Witwatersrand, but the authorities disrupted them both.^°
The ICU dominated the African political scene,
especially the organization of African labor, despite the
fact that South African Communist Party (SACP or CP) was
formed in 1921 and was only interested in white workers.
ICU's leader, Clemens Kadalie worked hard to raise the
political awareness of the African workers in South Africa.
While addressing workers in 1923, Kadalie told them,
...Your wives and children, yourselves
included, are continually sweating
making the white man and woman's life so
2’Meli, 42.
^°Carter and Karis, 65.
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easy, practically living in paradise,
while you are condemned to live in
hell....We believe that our race is just
as good as any race, if only we're given
same opportunities....^’
Such words were encouraging to the workers who so much
needed to be recognized by the South African labor
authorities who otherwise did not care about the well-being
of African workers and their families.
By appealing to the poor African masses the ICU became
more popular than the ANC which failed to rally the masses.
Kadalie's movement however, did not survive because
certain communist elements infiltrated it and turned many
workers away from it. Also, there were personal squabbles
between Kadalie and personalities in Congress who kept
pointing out that Kadalie was after all a Malawian. Such
petty squabbles discouraged him, but the workers were more
organized then than they ever were before.
When in 1927 the ICU held its annual conference it was
evident that the South African Communist Party had
infiltrated its ranks even though the conference had ruled
that no members of the ICU should be a member of the SACP.
Formed in 1921, the SACP was known to be working against the
interests of the Africans, always criticizing all efforts
the Africans were involved in.
During this time the Hertzog Bills, since proposed in
1926 by James B.M. Hertzog, after whom the bills were named,
^’ibid., 325.
37
and were concerned with the regulation of African labor and
a further dispossession of African land and thus
disenfranchisement of the Cape Africans, were gaining
popularity in the Union parliament, and they were eventually
passed in the 1936-37 period. Since the African political
parties were weak to act each on their own, an umbrella
body, the All-African Convention (AAC) was organized to
coordinate and lead African protest against these bills,
particularly the disenfranchisement of Africans from the
Cape's common voters' roll. The idea of Professor D.D.T.
Jabavu and Pixley Seme, president of the ANC, and
inaugurated in Bloemfontein in December 1935, the AAC
meeting was attended by over 400 delegates.
The AAC was not effective. The Hertzog Bills were
enacted and became law between 1936 and 1937 after the AAC
deputations to Cape Town failed to convince Hertzog during a
series of meetings with him. Some of the leaders of the
organization lost hope and thought that the best alternative
was to run for seats on the National Representative Council
(NRC) which was introduced by the government.
The AAC was bound to be a fiasco. Its definition of an
African was all-inclusive. This was a great step by the
AAC, had it limited its membership to the ANC, the ICU,
chiefs, African church leaders and professionals. Instead
membership was open to all including the elected members of
^^Meli, 84-85.
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advisory boards, representatives of a number of local
organizations, Coloureds from left-wing study circles in
Cape Town and also the members of the SACP.^^ All these
organizations had different views as to how the South
African problem was to be tackled. They disagreed on the
very basic issues. Adding to its lack of popular support,
another reason for the convention's failure was that some
people wanted the AAC "to establish itself as a permanent
body" during the time the ANC was undergoing a "gradual
process of revival, rejuvenation and re-emergence as a
central body" that sought to express African opinion in
South Africa.^^
Although the AAC tried to build links with rural
people, especially those in the Transkei, in a bid to create
a mass base, the ANC was the one that eventually gained such
support. By 1950 the AAC was no more.
Revival of African Political Resistance
The Proareunme of Action
The 1940s was generally a decade of political
reawakening on the continent and among the Africans in the
diaspora. It was a period of decision-making, a time for
serious business in African politics. In addition to the




African Conference in London in 1946 which many African
political leaders attended. A few leaders from Southern
Africa including Kamuzu Banda of Malawi and Peter Abrahams
also attended.
In South Africa particularly, the 1940s saw a
redirection of the liberation movement. There was so much
discontent in the ranks of the African National Congress
centering mainly around cooperation between African leaders
and white organizations, especially the South African
Communist Party. By 1940 there were several leading members
of the ANC who were members of the SACP as well, among them
Moses Kotane and Duma Nokwe who became prominent African
communists. Among those who expressed dissatisfaction with
the relationship between the ANC and the white liberals were
the up-and-coming young men who did not see any commonality
in the oppression of the African and other races in South
Africa. Most of these 'young' politicians in the ANC,
except for a few, had an education beyond high school; some
were educated in prestigious schools such as Lovedale,
Healdtown Adams college, and others were at Fort Hare
UniversityThis group was to form the ANC Youth League
in 1944.
When in 1940 Dr. Alfred Bitini Xuma became the
President-General of the ANC, many Africans had withdrawn
^^Carter and Karis, From Protest to Challenge Vol. 2,
98.
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their support, feeling that the ANC was not going to help
them. A self-confessed reformer, Xuma was careful in the
way he directed the already delicate organization. The
'reformer' became radical when he expressed dislike of the
"paternalistic and patronizing attitude of white
liberals.and was to write in March 1943 that
the best thing to be done is for the
European who believes in Christianity,
democracy and human decency, to back up
the stand taken by African organizations
led by Africans, financially and
otherwise, instead of them setting up
organizations staffed by Europeans in
which Africans become mere
passengers...The emancipation of the
African people shall come from
Congress... .^^
At the ANC annual conference held in Bloemfontein in
December 1941, Xuma announced that the organization was
rendered ineffective by the leaders who surrendered their
leadership to the liberal organizations because those
leaders felt that their leadership was inferior to the
leadership of those [white] organizations. With that he
sought to remind the conference of the aims of the ANC—to
unite the African people and lead them in their fight for
freedom.
The movement seemed to be recovering under the
leadership of Dr. Xuma, but it still addressed itself to the
^eli, 88.
and R.E. Simons, Class and Colour in South
Africa 1850-1950 (London: Penguin Books, 1969), 501.
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demands such as improved living wages and conditions for the
African, the right to learn skills, improved health care and
so on, and nothing near to the demand for majority rule.
This line of political thought changed at the formation of
the ANC Youth League, and the sxibsequent adoption of the
Programme of Action in 1949.
The Formation of the Youth League
The Congress Youth League (CYL) was not the first youth
organization ever to be formed in South Africa. In 1939
Manasseh Moerane and Jordan Ngubane founded the National
Union of African Youth which was based in Natal. But this
organization was short-lived because Moerane, a teacher and
a member of the National Bantu Teachers' Association, could
not continue with the organization because there were
restrictions for teachers to participate in politics; and
Ngubane, a news reporter, was summoned to join the "Bantu
World" in Johannesburg. Thus the National Union of African
Youth was a total failure.
The ANC Youth League was inaugurated in Johannesburg in
April 1944. The idea of a youth league came at a time when
the ANC needed rejuvenation after it had been out of
politics since the 1920s, and the 1937 and 1938 attempts to
resuscitate it were rendered futile. Josiah T. Gumede, the
president of the ANC at the time, was ousted from the
leadership for his involvement in the SACP.
42
One of the immediate objections of the ANC youth was
the dissatisfaction which they expressed with the alliance
between the ANC and the SACP, and (like Xuma had already
expressed), other liberals. The 'youths' did not see the
connection between the oppression of the African and that of
the whites, that if the other races had grievances against
the government they should organize their own groups. It
was no accident that they did not like the new constitution
that Dr. Xuma introduced that sought to recruit "any person
over 17 years of age who is willing to subscribe to the aims
of Congress and to abide by its Constitution and
rules....This led to Xuma losing support of the youth
even though he was for the idea of forming a women's and
youth leagues of the Congress. The fact is that there is a
great contradiction since the CYL's constitution itself
stated that other races were welcome. The youth league had
it in its constitution that other "young members of other
sections of the community who live like and with Africans
and whose general outlook on life is similar to that of
Africans may become full members".^’ In the final analysis
the Youth League's policies were the same as those of Xuma
and his colleagues, for this policy is also a departure from
the League's initial 'Africa for Africans' policy which is
doubtlessly exclusive. Enough room was left for other races
^^Carter and Karis, Vol. 2, 98.
^’ibid., 321.
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to join; whether they shared a similar outlook with the
Africans remains questionable. 'Living like and with
Africans' does not necessarily make them share the same
viewpoint.
Such mistakes in policy have contributed to the fact
that nationalism in South Africa is still a far-off reality,
as we shall point out in the subsequent chapters.
With Anton Lembede as president and Nelson Mandela
secretary, in five months the Youth League had a national
'Trumpet Call to Youth' and the response was widespread. The
immediate aim of the League was to strengthen African
National unity, a task which it undertook enthusiastically.
Other tasks of the League included working "privately as a
pressure group within the ANC and... publicly 'in arousing
popular political consciousnessBy so doing the CYL
hoped to infiltrate other African organizations. With its
'Africa for Africans' slogan the Youth League's message of
nationalism spread like wildfire.
In 1948 the Youth League had become very strong in
terms of organization and membership. It had branches
almost everywhere in the country, especially on school
campuses. The most significant of these campuses was Fort
Hare.^^ During this period, it should be noted, two
'^°Ibid., 102.
^^Fort Hare University was during the 1940s the hub of
African political leadership. It was the Makerere of
Southern Africa. Many Fort Hare graduates, including the
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important events took place. First, the general elections
of May 26, 1948 which gave the Afrikaner Nationalist Party
complete control of South African politics; second, the
Youth League published its 'Basic Policy' which outlined the
programme and tactics of the organization. The document
aroused the sentiment for mass action. This development
prompted the ANC to adopt the Programme of Action in 1949.
The document's main aim was the unification of the
heterogeneous ethnic groups and the freedom of the African
people from foreign domination.
The coming to power of the Nationalist Party in 1948
was a clear indication that the days for representation of
the Africans in the white government were over. The
'Afrikaners' were consolidating themselves into a power
structure, which establishment meant that the Africans were
to be excluded in whatever decision made by the government.
It was therefore not in vain that the CYL decided on
exclusive African Nationalism as a pillar of the African
struggle in South Africa. It was a well-thought of idea
because 1948 drew a line distinguishing two nationalisms—
African Nationalism and Afrikanerdom—for these were two
blends of Africans, the natives of the continent and the
descendants of the European settlers of Dutch origin. After
all, their leaving the Cape Colony was mainly because they
late Herbert Chitepo, Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze, Robert Mugabe
(all of Zimbabwe), and Ntsu Mokhehle of Lesotho, have been
and are still active in politics.
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(the Afrikaners) did not want to be one with the indigenous
Africans.
It should be borne in mind that the Nationalist Party
started operating as a political entity in 1910 when the
British colonies of Natal and the Cape merged with those
Boer Republics of Orange Free State and Transvaal to form
the Union of South Africa. Since then the laws of the land
were essentially conceived and enforced exclusively by the
Boer-dominated Nationalist Party. That is, Apartheid—a
collection of racially discriminatory laws designed to
ensure the political oppression and economic exploitation of
the African majority—was put in place since then.
Therefore, in 1948 Apartheid was not a new phenomenon.
It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that in
1949 the ANC, with active participation of the CYL, adopted
the Programme of Action (PA). The programme was merely
reiterating what the League's basic policies had already
laid down as guidelines of the liberation movement in South
Africa. It went further than the League's policy though in
that, after emphasizing principles of self-determination and
self-confidence and a pro-Africa policy, it stressed the
necessity for mass action. It called upon the African
masses to participate in demonstrations, strikes, stayaways
and protests. According to Bernard M. Magubane, the PA was
the first sortie from a politics of
conformity and persuasion to a politics
of confrontation... For the first time
the ANC turned consciously to the masses
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to stimulate political action and to
arouse their fighting spirit/^
The leadership of the ANC, as we shall learn later, was
not ready to take radical steps even where the situation
demanded. What many writers call radical, especially when
referring to the period during the 1950s, leaves a lot to be
desired.
The 19503—Decade of Apartheid
The 1940s concluded with the imposition by the
government of the Anti-Communist Act (1949) and the
Population Registration Act (1949). The former banned the
Communist Party and all activities that could be deemed
communistic by the government, and the latter was extended
to control the influx and labor of the Africans. It was
used in conjunction with the Pass Laws.
The 1950s was a decade punctuated simultaneously by
action and confusion. The decade was prefaced by the Group
Areas Act (1950) which "intensified the residential
segregation previously in effect under the [1923] Urban
Areas Act".'^^ This act provided for the designation of
each area the exclusive preserve of a particular group—
including African, Indians, Coloureds, and by implication




Indian merchants. In addition to these 1950 acts were the
Suppression of Communism Act, and the Immorality Act which
forbode interracial sex, and the Mixed Marriage Act which
prohibited interracial marriage. By all these laws the
Nationalist Party was entrenching itself, and it was
determined to test the strength of the liberation movement.
In 1950 the ANC was only airmed with the Programme of
Action which it had not put into practice. It is important
to note that to the CYL the coming to power of the
Nationalist Party meant uncompromising oppression on the
part of Afrikanerdom, and thus a perpetual challenge to
African Nationalism. To the mother body, the ANC, it was
time to seek alliances. In a way, it could be said that the
ANC betrayed its own voice, when suddenly it sanctioned as
essential the participation of other racial groups, for the
PA called for African self-determination. As we shall see
later, not all members of the CYL subscribed to this two-
tongued policy of the ANC.
In 1951 the Bantu Authorities Act, which transformed
the native reserves into 'homelands' or 'bantustans', was
passed and the kings were made paramount chiefs, thus losing
their traditional authority.
In 1952 the ANC thought that it was time it acted; the
government was going too far. When the ANC decided to send
a letter to Prime Minister Malan which called for "direct
representation by 'blacks' in government and for the repeal
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of the pass laws by 29 February 1952, the Group Areas Act,
the Separate Representation of Voters Act...”^'^ and other
laws, it also threatened that if these requests were not met
there was going to be demonstrations in defiance of those
laws. Meanwhile the ANC had already met with leaders of the
Coloureds and Indians who met with the ANC merely because
they wanted support against the termination of their common
roll representation by the Voters Act which the ANC included
in its demands.
Malan did not heed to the demands of the ANC, and the
Defiance Campaign (DC) was launched on June 26, 1952. It is
reported that about 8000 were apprehended for contravening
the law when Africans and Indians alike sat on railway
benches marked for 'whites only', and entered post offices
reserved for 'whites'.
In 1953 the campaign was called off because the
authorities meted strong punishment against all those who
defied apartheid. Besides, the campaign did not have the
anticipated support inside the ANC where some members
believed that the organization was being wrongfully used.
Some of the CYL members felt that the Programme of Action of
1949 was betrayed, that it had been "pushed aside" by the
"white and Asian communists, together with 'black'
communists, [who] had moved on the ANC and were exercising
^^Benjamin Pogrund, Sobukwe and Apartheid (New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1991), 52.
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The groups thatincreasing influence behind the scenes.
the African Nationalists, as the dissatisfied Youth Leaguers
came to be known, were referring to included the South
African Indian Congress (SAIC), South African Coloured
People's Organization (SACPO), and the white Congress of
Democrats (COD) which was viewed by the radical sect of the
Youth League as a front for the Communist Party.
The Nationalists were not impressed by the idea that
the ANC called a national convention of all races to
organize the 'Congress of the People', which in 1955 (June
25 and 26) adopted the notorious Freedom Charter. Most
disturbing to these ANC Nationalists (or if you like the
Africanist Movement, or simply the Africanists) was that the
preamble of the Freedom Charter was declaring that South
Africa belonging to all who lived in it, which the
Africanists viewed as the prostituting of the land among the
other members of the population who did not even care as
much about Africa. The communistic tone of the Charter was
also disturbing to the Africanists especially that the
Communist Party was at one stage in support of the white
workers as opposed to the African workers.
There was silence in the ANC after most of the
participants in the Congress of the People were rounded up
by the police in 1956. Meanwhile those ANC members who were
still free organized demonstrations against Bantu Education,
^^Ibid., 52.
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with the Women's League taking the lead in 1957 in a great
march to the Parliament in Pretoria to protest the extension
of the pass law to the African women.
By this time another movement was in the making. This
came about because the Africanists in the ANC were being
persecuted. Clashes between the ANC of the Charter and the
Africanists ensued with many people from both sides getting
hurt. A newspaper, the Africanist was published calling
people's attention to the main principles of the Programme
of Action of 1949. In 1959 the Pan Africanist Congress of
Azania (PAC) was inaugurated by its founder president,
Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe. Eleven months after its
formation, the PAC launched the anti-pass campaign which
resulted in what is today known as the Sharpeville massacre
after the South African authorities opened fire to peaceful
demonstrators on March 21, 1960.
When he was later interviewed by Pogrund, Z.B. Molete,
one time PAC Publicity and Information secretary, said that
his organization attacked the passes because "'the people
understood the problems brought about by the pass
laws....All that was needed was the determination of the
leadership itself and perhaps new methods of struggle'",
continuing to say that "'principally, it was the African who
bear the burden of the struggle because he was the one
'‘‘^Carter and Karis, Vol. 3, 403-405.
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concerned and other races were not'".^^ Mr. Molete was in
a nutshell actually summarizing what the PAC stood for—the
'go it alone' spirit which Steve Bantu Biko was to coin
'Black man, you are on your own'.
The Sharpeville events closed the chapter of legal





THE BEGINNING OF ARMED STRUGGLE
The 1960s was generally a decade of the beginning of
armed struggle in Southern Africa. The nationalists of
Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and, of course, Namibia and
South Africa, decided to challenge physically the white
settler colonialists of this region. These nationalists had
decided that there was no way they could bring the settler
colonialists to their senses but through the barrel of the
gun. Some of them felt that they had exhausted all means of
peaceful settlement—that their political struggles had
borne them no fruit.
Elsewhere in Africa armed struggle began as early as
the 1950s. For example, Algerians started fighting the
French colonists in 1954.
While the other African nationalists in other parts of
Southern Africa had taken firm stands in their decisions to
embark on armed struggle, those in South Africa, as we shall
see below, were not totally committed to it.
In South Africa the realization that the authorities
had raised their swords high, despite peaceful political
struggles, came when in March 1960 the South African armed
forces and police opened fire on peaceful anti-pass
campaigners in Sharpeville near Johannesburg. This incident
claimed 69 lives, with several other people sustaining grave
injuries.
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One of the consequences of Sharpeville was the banning
of both the PAG and ANC on 8 April, 1960. Immediately
following the proscription of the two organizations, leaders
felt that the only option, while they were still in the
country, was to operate underground. The extent of the
underground operations was reflected by the sabotage
activities of Umkhonto we Sizwe and the attacks on
individuals by POQO.
This chapter will discuss the formation of the military
wings of both the ANC and PAG, their activities in and out
of the country after their being outlawed.
Formation of the Armed winas
It is in order that before embarking on the formation
and activities of the organizations just mentioned above,
mention be made of organizations which tried to spark the
fire of armed revolution. Having been sent underground by
the banning order the previous year, the organizations had
worked very hard to mobilize people against South Africa's
declaration to become a republic.
In Pondoland, in the Cape Province, as many as 50,000
people were ready to challenge the authorities after their
demands for more land received a cold response. The Pondo
peasants kept resisting the harsh treatment they received
from the government, and had wanted to have weapons. This
resistance movement, Intaba (Mountain), had adopted
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guerrilla warfare tactics and was in control of many peasant
areas, in PondolandJ Lack of weapons saw the revolt
crushed. Nevertheless, it is clear that the nationalists
were affected by that peasant revolt.
Another organization which attempted to challenge the
authorities was the National Committee of Liberation which
was founded by white liberals and ex-communists. This
organization, which later became the African Resistance
Movement even though African membership was not confirmed,
staged the first sabotage act in October 1961.^ The
organization just faded away, after it staged a sabotage act
in 1964.
We may now discuss the armed wings of the ANC and PAC.
Emergence of Poao
Questions have been asked whether or not Poqo was a PAC
organization. It did not take long before it was discovered
that indeed it was a PAC front created by the organization's
'Task Force' of which John Nyati Pokela, who later became
head of the PAC in exile, was the organizer. During the
time the organization was underground efforts were made to
mobilize men who could help in realizing the PAC's objective
of freedom in 1963.
^Meli, 143-144.
^See Mary Benson, South Africa: The Struggle for a
Birthright (International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern
Africa, 1985), 237.
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The 'Task Force' of the PAC had created cells around
the country, especially in Orlando, Sharpeville,
Krugersdorp, Pretoria, Langa and Nyanga. But among these
cells those in Langa and Nyanga in the Western Cape proved
to be ready to act against the authorities. The people in
those cells had been infuriated by the South African
government's arrest of Philip Kgosana, a student in the
Cape, who organized and led the Pass Campaign there in 1960.
*
However, the most burning issue was in Paarl, where families
of workers were sent back to the reserves (because of the
Bantu Authorities Act), and about two thousand men were
forced to live in male-only compounds.^ The PAC men who
were working around that area saw the developments there as
a great opportunity to form a nucleus of revolutionaries.
A riot in which two whites were killed and several
others injured was reported on November 21, 1962 after seven
men were arrested for attacking suspected police informers.
An army of men armed with pangas, axes, and knob-kerries
roamed the night determined to kill whoever worked with the
government. Tribal headmen appointed by the government
became Poqo's victims. Poqo's attacks scared white people
when on February 1963 it killed five whites in a road camp
near the Bashee river.^
^Ibid., 240.
'^Ibid. , 244. See also Pogrund, 180.
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It is not difficult to decipher what Poqo stood for.
Its strategy was very simplistic, because having been rooted
in the interests of the masses, Poqo men did not waste time
intellectualizing about the struggle. Like the Mau-Mau in
Kenya, Poqo identified its enemy as the white man and that
the only way the Africans could be free was getting rid of
him, by 'driving him into the sea' where he had come from.
Poqo tried to answer state violence with their own.
For any African killed, one white man was going to die, with
him all the Africans who collaborated with the government.
By attacking the police stations, the panga-wielding Poqo
men had hoped to disarm the policemen and start a revolution
that would eventually result in the freedom of Africans—by
1963 .
Poqo had instilled fear in the government and the white
population in general was overcome with panic. It was on
this basis that the government sought to crush that movement
once and for all, and Potlako Kitchener Leballo, who
commanded Poqo from the PAC headquarters in Maseru, Lesotho,
helped in its destruction when on April 1, 1963 he made
public the decision to have a Poqo uprising.
Morgan Norval reports that Leballo had planned "a Night
of Death for April 8, 1962" in which "members of the 150
cells throughout the country" were to rise up and kill
whites. This plot did not succeed because, according to
Norval, a "foreign agent" had broken into the PAC office in
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Maseru and retrieved information that showed that Poqo was
about to launch its onslaught.^ The PAC offices were
raided, Poqo's cover blown; and what followed was the
uprooting of more than 3,000 Poqo activists,* and thus a
'quiescence' that followed the movement into exile.
An account on the progress of the PAC in exile will
follow shortly, but before then let us examine the rise of
another armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe.
The Rise of Omkhonto we Sizwe
Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) is not exactly
the armed wing of the African National Congress. Umkhonto
we Sizwe, or simply Mkhonto, was formed by leaders of the
Congress Alliance and the Communist Party of South Africa.
It was not the brainchild of the ANC as many would like us
to believe, but it was instead made up by members of the
Congress Alliance to which the ANC was affiliated. It was,
therefore, not an exclusively African military organization.
Indeed, its policy, as stated in the December 16, 1961
leaflet, is to the effect that the organization would uphold
the spirit of the alliance by fighting for the "black, brown
and white" people of South Africa.
^Morgan Norval, Inside the ANC (Washington, D.C.:
Selous Foundation, 1990), 69.
*Ibid. See also Robert Fine and Dennis Davis, Beyond
Apartheid: Labour and Liberation (London and Concord, Mass.:
Pluto Press, 1990), 247.
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Mkhonto had itself known to the public when on December
16, 1961 its High Command distributed a leaflet which
carried its intentions and vows of overthrowing the
government through violent means. There is evidence,
however, that by the time this leaflet was distributed the
organization was still nameless. It was only in 1962 that
Nelson Mandela, together with another founder member of
Umkhonto, Harold Strachan, revealed the name of the
organization to a group of men in Durban. Feit quotes Bruno
Mtolo as having said that the group was "brought together"
by Lionel Bernstein, a communist who also instructed the
group in sabotage.^
Having made the vow to carry on the national liberation
struggle until final victory, the leaflet vehemently stated
that
... The time comes in life of any nation
when there remains only two choices:
submit or fight. That time has come to
South Africa. We shall not submit and
we have no choice but to hit back by all
means within our power in defence of our
people, our future and our freedom...
We are striking out along a new road for
liberation of the people of this
country. The government policy of
force, repression and violence will no
longer be met with nonviolent resistance
alone!®
For a militant who really wants to overthrow a racist
oppressive government, this passage sounds quite
^Feit, 168-169.
^Carter and Karis, Vol. 3, 716.
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revolutionary. It could move the very hard headed person to
cry freedom there and then. But as it shall be shown later,
the authors are just 'paper tigers.'
Feit has concluded that the ANC only resorted to
violence because it "may have hoped to reestablish the ANC
as the leading African political organization, in response
to the challenge of the Pan Africanist Congress and its
militant wing Pogo."’ Competition between the ANC and PAC
has been going on for a long time; even in exile each
organization spent too much time trying to appear better
than the other before the international community and aid
donors. Such behavior contributed to the growth of the gap
between the two movements—at a time when they needed each
other.
Mkhonto chose sabotage as a means of achieving its
goal. Its stated intention was to destroy government
offices, communications and electric poles. Through this
Mkhonto hoped to render the country ungovernable during
which state of affairs guerrilla warfare would commence.
Although Um3chonto we Sizwe has claimed that it had no
intentions of endangering lives of individuals, its fighters
have occasionally killed policemen and deserters. In the
1980s the township youths, as part of ANC's plan of creating
’Feit, 312.
^°See Leonard Thompson and Andrew Prior, South African
Politics (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1982), 198.
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a state of confusion and establishing people's government,
had innocent people killed by "necklacing"—a method of
killing which requires a vehicle tire put around an
individual's neck and set on fire after gasoline had been
poured over it.
The sabotage activities of Umkhonto we Sizwe were
undertaken by hurriedly trained people who most of the time
ended up in the hands of the police. This was largely due
to the fact that the most important installations were under
heavily armed guard by the government forces. These
sabotage acts were planned by the Mkhonto architects at
Rivonia, near Johannesburg. Often saboteurs complained
about lack of dynamite, and as a result resorted to "quite
small-scale sabotage."”
After the Rivonia underground was exposed and the
leaders arrested, the sabotage activities also halted. All
the materials and chemicals used to produce bombs were
seized and destroyed by the authorities.
Thus were Mkhonto's activities themselves sabotaged.
However, there were a number of men sent out to receive
military training from as far as China, although they could
not perform any acts of sabotage since the chain of command
was disturbed by the arrests of leaders. Also the





By the time Poqo and Umkhonto we Sizwe (and other
groups) were controlled in the country, the PAC and ANC had
already established external missions and made contacts with
sympathetic countries such as Tanzania, Ghana, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Guinea, Sweden, China, the Soviet Union, and so
on. For this purpose Nana Mahomo and Peter Molotsi of the
PAC were sent out of the country after the bus boycott of
1958, while Oliver Reginald Tambo of the ANC left
immediately after the leaders of the liberation movement
went underground, following the Sharpeville incident. These
countries were courted to help the liberation movements and
their freedom fighters by providing shelter, financial
support, training facilities, and other basic necessities.
During his secret tour in Africa, Nelson Mandela also
established friendships with a number of African states for
the same purpose.
International organizations such as the United Nations
Organization, the Organization of African Unity, and the Pan
African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa
(PAFMECA), to name but a few, have shown keen interest in
the liberation struggle in South Africa and have provided
help as needed. Oliver Tambo of the ANC, and Vusumzi Make,
also of the PAC, were very articulate in presenting the
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apartheid problem to the United Nations.
In examining Southern African liberation movements in
exile, John Marcum identified three problems which the
movements had to grapple with, namely, environmental,
existential, and technical factors.’^ The same problems
were discussed by Leonard Kapungu in his analysis of the
"exile politics" of Zimbabwean liberation movements.
The liberation movements in South Africa have
encountered (and created for themselves) a lot of problems.
In order to understand the activities of these movements in
exile, it is wise to deal with each in turn. We shall begin
with the PAG.
The PAG in Exile
The PAG members who left the country found haven in
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, and only a few went as far
as Zambia. These three British protectorates were of great
advantage to the PAG because they were near the borders of
South Africa so that militants could respond swiftly in the
’^Richard Gibson, Gontemporarv Struggles Against White
Minority Rule (New York and London: Oxford University Press,
1972), 59.
’^John A. Marcum, "The Exile Gondition and
Revolutionary Effectiveness: Southern African Liberation
Movements," in Ghristian P. Potholm and Richard Dale (eds.)
Southern Africa in Perspective: Essays in Regional Politics
(New York: The Free Press, 1972), 262-297.
^^Leonard T. Kapungu, Rhodesia: The Struggle for
Freedom (New York: Orbis Books, 1974), 141-143.
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event that they were called to arms; also, there were
African nationalist movements, Ntsu Mokhehle's Basotho
Congress Party (BCP) in Lesotho, and Ambrose Zwane's Ngwane
National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) in Swaziland, which were
more drawn to the PAC's than the ANC's cause. Mass
mobilization was started right there, especially in Lesotho
and Swaziland where response from the masses was greater.
This because it is in the PAC's program to form a
confederation of Southern African states before the final
goal of a federal United States of Africa.
The problems with which the PAC had to struggle
included disorganization due to weak leadership,
mismanagement of funds, factional fights, and derecognition
of the organization by the OAU. First, the army had to be
organized according to the availability of men. A few men
who had gone to Tanzania were sent to Ghana, Ethiopia, Egypt
and Algeria for military training. On their return they
were sent to the camps in Bagamoyo, Tanzania, where they
formed the Azania People's Liberation Army (APLA), after
which formation some of the men were sent to Zambia, so that
they were close to the South African borders. (The exact
date of APLA's formation is not known, but it should be
around 1964). Second, the strategy of the organization was
reconsidered. Poqo's strategy was the thing of the past
because the men had guns. P.K. Leballo has outlined the
movement's strategy as a people's war as fought by the
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Chinese, the Cubans and the Vietnamese, and that, however,
the revolution in South Africa should be fought on two
fronts—that, because of South Africa's industrialization,
it should include people in both the rural and urban
areas The masses were to be armed and and trained to
terrorize the regime until it gave up power. Terrorism in
the understanding of the PAC was to be in accordance to its
slogan, 'One Settler, One Bullet.'
There were in 1961 other members of the PAC, Philip
Kgosana among them, who wished to establish a government in
exile. There was a lot of indiscipline among the members.
The acting president in Maseru, P.K. Leballo, could not
control all the representatives who were otherwise far from
the movement's headquarters.^^ Besides some members did
not recognize Leballo's leadership, especially after the
1963 POQO arrests, and since many national executive members
were in gaol external leadership became disorganized—a
problem that the PAC had to endure over the years. At one
time, it is said, Sobukwe tried to run the organization from
gaol.^^ This was mainly because there was no trained
leadership which could take over in case other leaders were
in trouble.
^^Gibson, Contemporary Struggles. 101.
^^C.J. Driver, Patrick Duncan:South African and Pan-




In 1968 seven members of the National Executive
Committee reported on June 10 that P.K. Leballo was no
longer the acting president of the organization. According
to Africa Report, in an article entitled "Split in PAC
Leadership”, this group charged Leballo with "'subverting
the Azanian revolution," abolished the office of Acting
President, and ordered the immediate closing of PAC offices
outside South Africa "pending further notice.'"’® Leballo
in turn said that the Executive members were liars who were
power-hungry. He retaliated by suspending the constitution
of the movement, rallied some of the members of the
executive around him and dismissed his 'adversaries.'”
Leballo's carelessness led him into meddling in affairs
which did not require his concern. In 1970 he was
incriminated in a plot to overthrow Tanzania's Julius
Nyerere. Tanzania's ex-foreign Minister O. Kambona and ex-
Minister M. Kamazila wanted Leballo to recruit PAC fighters
to help them in deposing Mwalimu Nyerere's government.
This Leballo did at the expense of the organization. Even
today it is not known what his motives were.
’®''Split in PAC Leadership," Africa Report (May 1-
August 31, 1968), 45.
”lbid.
^°Kenneth W. Grundy, Confrontation and Accommodation in
Southern Africa; Limits of Independence (Berkeley, Los
Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1973),
206. See also New York Times. July 13, 1970, p. 12; 19, p.
12.
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Money also contributed to the problems in the PAG in
that representatives did not send all the funds they raised
to the Maseru office because they needed some of the money
to run their offices. According to Driver, there was a
situation in Dar es Salaam whereby the Treasurer-General,
A.B. Ngcobo, did not have control over the funds coming in
because the chief representative, Peter Molotsi, "had an
account to which he was sole signatory.A commission of
enquiry was suggested after which the money in Molotsi's
name was frozen, and he was suspended from the organization.
This trend continued for a long time whereby portfolios
were changed from year to year.
The lack of trustworthy leadership killed the morale of
many members, especially those militarily trained. Seeing
the irredeemable position of the organization, some members
joined the ANC. Many members of both organizations sought
refuge in the other's camps each time they felt neglected by
the leadership. They did so probably because they thought
they could be sent home to fight eventually, always only to
realize when it was late that the two organizations had
operated in similar ways.
Most of these 'dissidents' seem to have come from the
PAG because of its instability. Disappointed in the
leadership some PAG (APIA) soldiers took it upon themselves
to start the revolution. They thought that waiting for
^^Driver, 235.
67
their leaders to settle their conflicts would waste time.
So, under the leadership of one Gerald Kibwe Nkondlo, the
APLA men set off in 1968 with the aim of reaching South
Africa through Mozambique. However, they did not make it
because they were intercepted by the Portuguese forces who
called for reinforcement from South Africa. Several APLA
men, including their commander, Nkondlo, were killed, and,
while some of the survivors were captured, others managed to
escape to Zambia.This incident did nothing but
frustrate the more the lot of the militants who thought that
the group would open up the way for them. Once in Zambia,
the PAG militants, tired of being leaderless, wanted to
bring their leadership to agree to a conference to discuss
the liberation struggle. But the leaders kept promising,
and did nothing to that effect. The guerrillas decided to
kidnap Tsepo K. Letlaka and "some other leaders", in order
to force their leadership to conference; this action led to
the expulsion in 1968 of the organization from Zambian
territory
From Zambia the militants went to Tanzania where they
either languished in the camps or found themselves women and
settled in the villages.
^^See Gibson, 101.
^John Marcum, adapted from the U.S. Congress,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of Special Study
Mission to Southern Africa (August 10-30, 1969, by Hon.
Charles C. Diggs and Hon. Lester Wolff, 91st Congress, 1st
Session, October 10, 1969).
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When the 1976 youngsters reached Dar es Salaam they
were not taken to the camps, so that they could not mix with
the older ones, because the leadership feared that they
could be corrupted by those already at the camps. They were
instead told that the older soldiers did not want to go and
fight.
Having divided the militants thus, the leaders were
able to use one group against the other. Somehow the
militants found out that they were being misinformed about
the existing situation. They were pawns in factional
conflicts. They became very close to P.K. Leballo who told
them how unprincipled and corrupt other leaders were. This
group helped Leballo reestablish himself as leader of the
organization at the 1978 Arusha conference.
It was at this conference where a splinter group led by
Reginald Ntantala broke away from the PAC to form the Azania
People's Revolutionary Party (APRP), a purely Marxist-
Leninist Party. With all the connections he had, Ntantala
could not get enough support to sustain his party; so the
party fell.
At this point the O.A.U. decided to derecognize the
PAC. Ten years earlier, the O.A.U. withdrew funds from the
PAC which, along with other movements, was regarded as
either '"unrepresentative" or "ineffective"' promising to .
reconsider its recognition as soon as the dust in the
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organization settled.
Leballo' leadership ended in 1979 when he was forced to
resign and leadership was shared by three men—David Sibeko,
Vusumuzi Make and Henry Isaacs. But with Leballo's men
still at large, Sibeko was assassinated, and after his death
the leadership fell on Make who acted as president.
Members of APRP were allowed back to the ranks of the
PAC when John Nyati Pokela assumed leadership of the
movement in 1981 after serving thirteen years of the twenty
year sentence on Robben Island. He replaced the leadership
of Vusumzi Make.
PAC's last factional fight was in 1982 in Maseru,
Lesotho, between a PAC group loyal to Pokela's leadership,
and one led by Sidzamba, a former PAC representative who
disapproved of the Dar es Salaam leaders, charging that they
were corrupt and unwilling to fight. Order was restored and
Sidzamba's group was expelled from the party.
Under Pokela the PAC seemed to be progressing smoothly,
but after his death in 1985 the PAC had gone back to its
state of weakness. Pokela was succeeded by Johnson Mlambo,
another Robben Island graduate.
^^"Organization of Africa Unity," Africa Report (May 1-
August 31, 1968): 25.
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ANC in Exile
During its settlement in exile, the ANC, like the PAG,
experienced factional divisions, ideological clashes,
tribalism, and recently power struggle in the ANC armed
wing, Umkhonto.
Unlike the PAG, the ANC was not exactly welcomed by
some of the independent African countries' leaders who did
not favor its multi-racial alliance, especially its
association with the Communist Party. For instance, Ghana
tended to be more "inclined towards the rival PAG with its
explicit pan-African ideology," and even after the formation
of the O.A.U. in 1963, the ANC, for the same reason, could
not get fair treatment in the Liberation Committee's
allocation of aid.^^ We shall discuss this factor in the
next chapter when we deal with the role of the O.A.U. in the
struggle in South Africa.
The most burning issue in the ANC has been that which
involves the presence and obvious dominance of the ANC by
the Communist Party. This dissatisfaction about the
communists started in the 1920s, and in the '50s some of the
'Africanists,' while others formed the PAC, remained in the
Congress Alliance with the hope of getting rid of the
communist elements in their organization.
^^Sheridan Johns, "Obstacles to Guerrilla Warfare,"
Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 11, No. 2 (June
1973): 277-78.
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By the time the ANC went into exile, it was still a
separate organization from Umkhonto we Sizwe. Efforts were
made to have the two organizations come together. The
difficulty of them coming together was that the ANC
leadership was not yet ready to embark on a violent road to
independence of South Africa. Over the years the ANC would
allow its members to join Mkhonto, but would not itself
profess violence. It was only in the mid-sixties that the
ANC agreed on a physical confrontation against the South
African government, and that was confirmed by the
consultative conference held in 1969 at Morogoro, Tanzania.
The Morogoro Conference, convened from April 23 to May
1, 1969, came at a time when there were "sharp clashes
between veteran leaders after the death of Chief Luthuli in
1967, opposition to the continuing leadership of Tambo, and
widespread rumors of a forthcoming split in the
movementThe ANC confirmed such rumors nine days
after the conference saying that the cause of their
weaknesses was mainly organizational.^^ Among other issues
the conference confirmed and entrenched the communist party
in the higher echelons of the movement. One leader of the
Communist Party, Joe Slovo, became the undisputed commander
of the armed forces, and Mkhonto's strategist.
^^Gibson, 73.
^^See Mavibuve (10 May, 1969): 4.
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The Morogoro conference, as it is said of the Freedom
Charter, was organized by the SACP. To start with, the
conference was chaired by SACP's chairman, J.B. Marks, so
that it was easier for Joe Slovo to be endorsed as the chief
strategist of Umkhonto we Sizwe. Africa Confidential, in an
article entitled "South Africa: The Party Faithful," claims
that even the "Strategy and Tactics of the ANC" which was
adopted by that conference was the combined efforts of Slovo
and Joe Mathews, another high ranking communist.^® Also,
according to Brian Bunting, the document, which was
originally entitled "The Revolutionary Program of the ANC,"
"endorsed once again the ANC's adherence to the Freedom
Charter and discussed its validity and the manner in which
it could be implemented in the current situation."^’ As it
is, the ANC had no say in the decision making of the
liberation movement. One of the commanders of Umkhonto we
Sizwe, Chris Hani, now General Secretary of the South
African Communist Party and ANC executive member confirmed
once again SACP's dominance of ANC when he said, "We in the
Communist Party have participated in and built the ANC. We
have made the ANC what it is today and the ANC is our
28 "South Africa: The Party Faithful," Africa
Confidential Vol. 31, No. 1 (January 12, 1990).
^’Brian P. Bunting, Moses Kotane: South African
Revolutionary (London: Inkululeko Publications, 1975), 281.
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organization.
The Conference also decided to create a body charged
with the responsibility of planning and directing the armed
struggle. The 'Revolutionary Council', as the body is
called, according to Francis Meli, himself an ardent
communist, was among other things supposed to deal directly
with "...guerrilla operations and the injection back home of
our trained personnel to form the core of the armed force.
This was meant to correct the imbalance between the work of
the movement externally.. . .
In 1975 part of the ANC African Nationalists (ANC/AN),
called the 'Group of Eight', under the leadership of Ambrose
Makiwane rose to challenge the ANC/Communist Party marriage
claiming that it is a deterrent to the liberation struggle
because the CP had assumed almost total control of the
movement. The Nationalists queried that other people in the
ANC were not consulted on matters that involved the
organization. Norval quotes Makiwane as having said that
"the trouble African people have at present is that our
strategy and tactics are in the hands of, and dominated by,
a small clique of non-Africans" and blamed it all on the
Morogoro conference which favored multiracialism.





According to the PAC the ANC/AN sought to "resurrect black
claims to the succession and repudiated the Charterist
deviation on the land and National and leadership
questions"The PAC has been interested in this
difference because it had allies in the ANC/AN with which it
wanted to forge a united front.
The communists justify their leading role in the ANC
through Marxist-Leninist rhetoric saying that as a communist
party, SACP should be at the head of a "National Democratic
Revolution", and accordingly the ANC, due to its liberal
membership policies, "attracts" all "revolutionaries" to its
ranks. The Communist Party sees "the need to give correct
guidance to the revolutionary cause..." and offer the
"correct leadership of the democratic revolution" which
"requires the strengthening of the national movement as the
major mass organizational force....This infuriated the
African Nationalists who felt that the communists were
undermining their intelligence, that it implied that the
Africans were not capable of leading their own liberation
struggle.
However, the African Nationalists did not have a strong
backing within the ranks of the ANC. They were harassed,
and when they eventually left the ANC they went their
^^The National Question (A PAC publication, Undated),
33 .
^^The African Communist No. 87 (Fourth Quarter, 1981) :
32-35.
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different ways. Several of them went to the Makeni Refugee
Center in Zambia where they operated a United Nations-
sponsored project making furniture. In the 1980s some of
them formed what came to be known as the ANC of South Africa
(Mandela). They anticipated that Nelson Mandela, whom they
had known to be sympathetic to African Nationalism, would
eventually be released and lead them. The O.A.U. and other
international organizations did not recognize this group
which eventually disintegrated.
Like the PAC the ANC suffered loss of personnel. These
'dissidents' also reported dissent against the communist
influence in the ANC. Gibson reports that an ANC member of
the National Committee, Lawrence Makhubu, left in 1968 with
a group of men from Tanzania into Kenya where they asked for
political asylum; while there the group released a statement
that they wanted to "...resist all attempts to make South
African revolutionaries tools of the lukewarm South African
Communist Party or the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union.Many other guerrillas left Mkhonto for the same
reason.
Other reports reveal that there have been corruption
and unequal treatment of militants going on. Tribalism and
ideological opposition led to some non-Xhosas going "on
suicide missions inside Rhodesia...while the leadership was
^^Gibson, 70-71, quoting Omar Bamjee, Amin Cajee,
Hoosain Jacobs, and Maurice Mthombeni, "Why We Left
'Umkhonto we Sizwe' (ANC in Exile)."
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not willing to share in any way the risks of the battle,"
that the 1967 ANC-ZAPU incursion was "to get rid of unwanted
dissenters...whoever spoke against the Kremlin and its
policies...was branded a fifth columnist who was against the
liberation of South Africa."^* These problems continued
into the 1990s. This leads us to conclude that many other
militants who were killed over the years by South African
forces inside South Africa were part of the sacrificial
missions that the 'dissidents' spoke of.
In 1990 the differences in the ranks of Umkhonto
sharpened when Thabo Mbeki, who heads the foreign department
of the ANC, and Chris Hani, a military commander, did not
agree on whether or not armed struggle should be suspended
in favor of negotiations. Both Mbeki and Hani have been
having dual membership in the ANC and SACP.
Mbeki represented the group that was in favor of
negotiations while Hani drew the support of the militants
who wanted to intensify the armed struggle by taking the war
into the suburbs, a group which is in the majority. Mbeki's
fight was joined by Oliver Tambo who argued that such
actions as those Hani suggested "were not ANC policy;"
hence, ANC in a bid to isolate Hani and his party did not
say anything after Ellis Park stadium near Johannesburg was




faction is joined by Mandela who is now spearheading the
negotiations with the South African government.
Meanwhile the ANC camps in Angola were closed when that
country on the one hand, and the South Africans and the
United States on the other, agreed to cease supporting ANC
and UNITA respectively, so that the Namibian peace
settlement could be concluded. This was for the ANC a blow
below the belly because Mkhonto militants had to be taken to
another camp in Uganda, which is many miles from the South
African borders.^®
Of the two organizations, the ANC suffered the most
infiltration by South African spies, thanks to its open
policy of recruitment. Of the notorious spies that almost
crippled the ANC is Craig Williamson who we mention here
only in passing, and whose story will be discussed when we
examine South Africa's counter-insurgency measures.
Generally, after their banning order the two movements
behaved in similar ways in exile. They wanted to organize
themselves and lay down their strategies. Although they had
those strategies on paper, putting them into practice had
been a problem due to the factors just discussed. The
following chapter, because it deals with factors inhibiting
the struggle, will expand on these factors for they also
contribute to failure of armed struggle.
^®"ANC in Uganda," Africa Confidential Vol. 30, No.6
(March 17, 1989): 6.
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CHAPTER FOUR
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO FAILURE
This chapter deals with a wide range of factors
impeding the progress of armed struggle in South Africa. It
discusses the following factors: attitude of leaders,
disunity among the Africans in general and liberation
movements in particular, the response by the government, the
role of the OAU and the Frontline States, and Lack of bases.
Attitude of Leadership
The South African revolution is led by men whose
attitude towards armed struggle may be described as almost
noncommittal. The bulk of the leaders have been educated in
missionary schools,’ and their attitudes to national
liberation have been shaped by Christian values. They did
not believe in violence, and had hoped for peaceful change
even amid the violent actions of the South African military
and police forces. For instance, ANC's first president.
Rev. John L. Dube, saw oppression of the Africans as
resulting from heathenism that befell the oppressor, and
hoped that one day that heathenism would be conquered
through the help of "the soldiers of the Lord”. He said
’see Peter Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in
South Africa: The African National Congress 1912-1952
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press:
1971), 7-10.
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that these "soldiers” would "...arise and press forward
until all the kingdoms of this earth [have] become kingdoms
of God and this Christ".^
So ingrained was Christianity in some of these leaders
that one chief, who was also leader of an ANC branch said
that he belonged to the "Christian people at Edendale", when
asked what his tribe was.^
After 1912 the leadership of the African people was
taken over by these educated men, some of whom were church
ministers. Violence in as far as this group was concerned
was thought of as political anarchy. These leaders wanted
the incorporation of Africans into the white government,
hence over the years they fought against white
discrimination of 'blacks'; 'black' representation in the
[white] parliament, that is, and not majority rule. John
Tengo Jabavu, another leader of the ANC, "urged that
Africans be made members of the proposed Native Affairs
Commission ." Other leaders also wished "opportunities for
African political representation be expanded beyond modest
schemes contained in the Native Affairs Act...."^ To a
greater extent the leaders wanted to improve the living
conditions of the urban elite, although the 1912
constitution of the ANC called for improvement and
^Carter and Karis, Vol. 1, 68-69.
^Ibid., 94.
^Ibid., 67. See also Peter Walshe, 46-47.
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upliftment of the African life. This was shown by their
neglect of the African workers throughout their tenure; and
hence Clemens Kadalie founded Industrial and Commercial
Workers' Union (ICU) in the 1920s, and left the ANC without
a program until the birth of the Youth League.^
The Youth League, as we have seen, was the first mass
organization which wanted to get to the level of the
uneducated African, and it stressed the principle of
national self-determination, a principle which even the ANC
of today is still deficient in. However, this plan was
interrupted by the older leaders (and other young members)
who entangled the liberation movement in multiracial
alliances. The multiracial nature of the alliances forced
the ANC leaders to press for constitutional reform and
representation of minorities in the whiteparlaent.*
Even the leaders of the PAC, which is supposed to be
radical, did not profess to engage in the violent overthrow
of the white government, although they made it clear that
the oppressor and the oppressed, the dispossessor and the
dispossessed, could not sit together to decide the fate of
the dispossessed and oppressed majority. These leaders also
continued with the political struggles. After Sharpeville
they did not commit themselves to, although they left open
^Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa (New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1990), 176-177.
*See Ngubane, 164.
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the option for, violence.^ What the PAG leadership
demonstrated, however, was that Africans could lead and win
their own war.
The Post-Sharpeville leaders were also not fully
committed to armed struggle. Many of them dissociated
themselves from Poqo and Umkhonto we Sizwe. In the case of
the PAG, Leballo and Josias Madzunya seem to have been the
only ones interested in the activities of Poqo. According
to Benjamin Pogrund, Mangaliso Sobukwe did not even know
about the formation of Poqo. Sobukwe, for instance, had
hoped that during his lifetime "real change may take place
in South Africa without recourse to violence and
bloodshed."® We have indicated that Umkhonto is not ANG's
product, so it stands to reason that the leaders of ANG had
not decided on a violent path. It was only in 1967 that the
ANG formally agreed to embark on armed struggle.
It is not hard to get the reasons for this delay, the
African nationalists were generally afraid of engaging in a
violent civil war. Earlier on Mandela had supplied one
reason:
We viewed the situation with alarm.
Givil war could mean the destruction of
what the ANG stood for; with civil war,
racial peace would be more difficult
than ever to achieve.... It has taken
more than fifty years for the scars of




much longer would it take to eradicate
the scars of an inter-racial civil war,
which could not be fought without a
great loss of life on both sides.’
What is difficult to understand, however, is the way many of
the leaders of the liberation movements reasoned.
What the leaders have to be concerned about is the
protection of their own people and winning the struggle for
freedom.
Exile leadership
Because of the harassment they received from the South
African police, many leaders and some members of the ANC and
PAC, as we have already mentioned, fled to neighboring
countries of Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland, and some went
as far as Zambia, Tanzania, and other African countries. A
small minority managed to reach Europe.
Once in exile the leaders of both ANC and PAC forgot
their main objective. As we have hinted above, they got
engaged in corrupt activities; they wanted to amass wealth
for themselves—at the expense of the revolution. The
number of men in military or refugee camps became very
important to these leaders. All they had to do was to
provide the donors with numbers of the individuals in the
camps and they would receive thousands, sometimes millions
of dollars. Hence those who left the camps were hunted
’Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk to Freedom. Ruth First,
ed. (London: Heinemann Educational, 1965), 170.
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down, beaten up, and sometimes disappear mysteriously—for
these leaders feared exposure, and once exposed, their
source of money would be cramped.
That is why any dissatisfaction from the rank and file
must be suppressed at all times. For example, recently in
Zambia four members of Umkhonto who complained about the
corruption of leaders were detained and beaten up by their
comrades who were instructed to do so by some leaders; and
when they got the chance, the four escaped and sought
protection from the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees.
Some leaders have also been involved in illicit
behavior to satisfy their greed for money and comfortable
exile life. High ranking officials of the PAC were
incriminated in cases which involved drug dealing and car
theft—a report which was linked to the new split in the
PAC, but denied by the Finance Secretary, Joe Moabi, who
said that "any one found guilty" of such crimes "would be
expelled"^’ from the organization.
Yet the revolution is at a standstill.
^°Africa Confidential Vol. 30, No. 17 (25 August,
1989): 3.
^^Race Relations Survey (Johannesburg: South African
Institute of Race Relations, 1988): 759.
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Dissociation from the masses
The leaders of the liberation movements acted like
heads of states, getting invitation to one cocktail party
after another. It is not surprising that some of these
leaders wanted to form a government in exile. They wanted
to direct the struggle from the comfort of their homes in
Europe, basing their analysis on newspaper and radio reports
of what is exactly happening at the home front. Oliver
Tambo, for example, lived in London for all his exile life;
even when he visited Africa he would meet the cadres only
when there were conferences. Some who have families in
Europe, like PAG Secretary-General, Joe Mkhwanazi, call that
place 'home'. Seldom had the leaders spent some time with
the cadres, let alone with the masses.
Of the well-known nationalist leaders in South Africa,
Nelson Mandela is the only one who had undergone military
training and was prepared to fight side by side with the
masses. In his own words, he did that so as "...to be able
to fight with my people and to share the hazards of war with
them."^^ The importance of the leadership in the
revolution is delivered by Kapungu. Giving an account of
his experience of the Zimbabwean revolution, he warns that
"if the revolution is to succeed there must be an end to an
’^See Africa Confidential (3 July 1985) : 26.
^^elson Mandela, The Struggle is mv Life (London:
Pathfinder Press, 1986), 170.
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unapproachable leadership... No revolution can succeed if
the leaders do not struggle side by side with their
followers.
Other leaders like Amilcar Cabral, Eduardo Mondlane and
Jonas Savimbi have demonstrated that in order for the armed
forces and the masses to have confidence in their
leadership, they should mingle with them. They must make it
their duty to share in their day to day struggles—eat what
they eat; sleep with them in caves and tents; and above all
give command and reports on the progress of the struggle
while right in the bush, and not from some fancy five star
hotel in Europe. As Chaliand put it, "...There must be
continuous interaction between leadership, cadres,
guerrillas, and peasants through information, explanation,
dialogue and the exchange of criticism.
Thus, leaders, the masses and cadres alike should
maintain constant exchange of ideas, without antagonizing
one another. Criticism is necessary for rectifying
mistakes; after all, all humans are fallible.
^^Leonard T. Kapungu, Rhodesia: The Struggle- for
Freedom (New York: Orbis Books, 1975) 155.
^^Gerard Chaliand, Armed Stimaale in Africa: With the
Guerrillas in "Portuguese" Guinea (New York and London:
Monthly Review Press, 1969), 124.
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Faith in the International nommunitY
The faith of South African nationalist leaders in the
world coimunity is largely due to the miscalculation of
these leaders, and their already mentioned phobia for armed
struggle. They hoped that the organizations such as the UN,
the Non-Aligned Movement, the O.A.U., the Anti-Apartheid
Movement and the Commonwealth would exert enough pressure on
South Africa in time to avoid bloodshed.
In the UN, where they have observer status, the
liberation movements, with the help of the African group and
the third world and socialist countries, campaigned
vehemently for sanctions to be imposed against South Africa.
The situation following Sharpeville, no doubt, won
sympathies from the international community. From 1960 on,
the world community sought to isolate South Africa until it
had abandoned its discriminatory laws and allowed franchise
to all races there. The African group in the UN wielded
enough power to influence world opinion on the South African
question. So strong was the influence that Dag
Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations, was
forced to pay South Africa a visit in January 1961 "in
pursuance of the Security Council resolution that called on
South Africa after Sharpeville 'to abandon its policies of
Apartheid'."’^ The attention focused on the South African
situation led to a temporary diplomatic and economic
^'^Carter and Karis, Vol. 3, 3 60.
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isolation of that country and the establishment in 1962 of a
Special Committee on Apartheid.
Another event that encouraged the African nationalists
was the March 1960 expulsion of South Africa from the
Commonwealth. Carter and Karis report that even the
obstinate partners of South Africa, United Kingdom and
Australia, had in April of that year joined the United
States in voting "for a resolution calling on all states to
consider taking such action as was open to them to bring
about the abandonment of Apartheid” even though before then
they "had abstained or voted against UN resolutions critical
of South Africa."’^
The role of the Commonwealth became especially
important particularly during the Zimbabwean revolution.
Its Sanctions Committee became particularly powerful in
exerting pressure through the U.N. for countries,
specifically Britain, to put more pressure on the Rhodesian
government even though toward the end of 1969 it was to
conclude that sanctions were not working.^®
During the upheavals of the 1980s the Commonwealth sent
a delegation to woo South Africa to scrap apartheid. But
South Africa had her own program and dismissed the Eminent
Persons Group, as the delegation was known. Even Olusegun
^^Ibid.
^®Eshmael Mlambo, Rhodesia: Struggle for a Birthright
(London: C. Hurst and Company, 1972), 182-183.
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Obasanjo, the leader of the delegation, realized that trying
to convince South Africa was a futile exercise. He said,
"We have tried talking to the [South African] government and
it didn't work."’’ This intransigence of that government
is not new. South Africa has repeatedly told the
international community that what is happening within her
borders was her sole problem, that there was no power in the
world that could tell her how to protect her 'people' from
'terrorists'.
The nationalist movements should have known from the
beginning that while they needed help from the world the
burden of liberating their country depended entirely on
their own ingenuity and strength.
Indeed with the present leaders, the Africans in South
Africa should forget about armed struggle. Having been
misled by these persons for thirty years, they should think
of starting to create leaders all over again. Otherwise
they have proven all through the years that they have the
spirit to start the revolution if they could get a
leadership which is dedicated and committed to the struggle;
a leadership that is not going to take their sacrifices for
granted, but a leadership with whom they will struggle to
have what is desired by all—freedom and independence.
’’"Interview," Africa Report Vol. 31, No. 5 (September-
October 1986): 5.
89
Measures bv the Government
Like most governments opposed by other sectors of the
population, the government of South Africa has always
anticipated that the African liberation movements might, in
the long-run seek to overthrow it by force, so it did not
want to be caught napping. By the time the liberation
movements decided on undertaking violence as a means of
realizing their freedom, the government was long prepared.
Political and Psychological Measures
For starters, the government has created laws (some of
which were discussed in chapter two) that made it impossible
even for the general African population to engage in any
activity that might in any way endanger the welfare of the
minority government. When the Nationalists came to power,
they deposed all the chiefs who were democratically elected
by the masses (for example Chief Luthuli of the ANC, and
Chief Sabata Dalindyebo in the Transkei), and put their
puppets at the reigns of leadership, in preparation for the
implementation of the Homeland Act which came into effect in
1960. The homeland system was meant to keep the majority of
the African population in their respective tribal
'reserves.' This was, of course, reinforced by the Pass and
Influx Control Laws designed to keep at a minimum the number
of Africans in the 'White Areas'.
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But the most crippling effect of the Bantustan policy
is the tribal division and antagonism that it bred. That
effect can still be felt even to this day. For a long time
in Natal, for instance, there have been clashes between the
Msingas and the Dlaminis. Occasionally the authorities
pitted the Africans against one another, as it was the case
in 1976 when the Zulu migrant laborers indiscriminately
attacked the township dwellers of SOWETO,killing males
and raping females. The South African Police (SAP),
although aware of the situation, would not intervene. It
took the Basotho men who defended the residents, and after
some days of clashes. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, to quell the
Mzimhlophe War, as the incident came to be known.And
presently the clash between the Zulus of Gatsha Buthelezi's
Inkatha Freedom Party and the Xhosa element in the ANC
culminated in a bloody war that continues to claim hundreds
of people.
The Bantustans have auxiliary armies created by the
South African government with the aim of forming a 'buffer
zone' to protect the 'white area' of S.A. from any external
invasion and from insurgent infiltration into the country.
So much supported are these puppet 'governments' that
any dissent by their respective populations is suppressed by
^°T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa; A Modern History. 4th
ed. (Houndmills, Basington, Hampshire and London: MacMillan
Academic and Professional, Ltd., 1991), 390.
^’'ibid.
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the South African government itself. A good example is the
case of Bophutha-tswana when in 1988 Rocky Malebane-Metsing
deposed President Lucas M. Mangope; the coup was suppressed
by the South African Defence Force only sixteen hours after
it had happened.Attempted coups in Ciskei and Transkei
were thus suppressed, and the riots in KwaNdebele were also
crushed by the South African forces.
The idea of having a guerrilla insurrection within the
borders of South Africa made the South African authorities
uncomfortable, and they sought to combat such insurrection
in every way. The police and the army were prepared
psychologically, and trained in counter-insurgency
techniques.^
Training for the security police is extensive. This
unit is equipped with methods of breaking down political
prisoners. From 1965 on the Special Branch police were at
work trying to "stamp out" opposition from all directions.
The informer system is one of the most effective methods
used by the Special Branch which disorganized the liberation
movements, because many people who were informers
infiltrated them, and told the police about every piece of
22"The Sixteen-Hour President," Drum (March, 1980): 22-
23 .
^Richard Leonard, South Africa at War (West Port,
Connecticut; Lawrence Hill and Company, 1983) 198-200.
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Thisinformation they thought was anti-government.^^
affected the liberation movement because many leading
activists were silenced, others through detention and house
arrests.
So organized was the informer system that the South
African Security Police could infiltrate the movements in
exile. The ANC, which opened its ranks to people of all
races, was easy target for infiltration by white members of
the security police. The most notorious of these security
police was Craig Williamson who, working as a deputy
director of the International University Exchange Fund
(lUEF), which supported educational projects of some of the
liberation movements in Southern African, ANC included,
became a member of the ANC. In 1982 Williamson revealed
that he worked for the Bureau of State Security, BOSS; and
during his tenure with the lUEF and membership in the ANC,
he had accumulated enough information that crippled the
organization. Commenting on the ANC, he said:
...the ANC/SACP alliance has proved over
27 years to be the most incompetent and
least successful Soviet-backed
revolutionary organization...in the
world. Nowhere else has a revolutionary
group supported by the Soviets been so
decisively battered time and again and
^^Leonard Thompson and Andrew Prior, South African
Politics. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1982), 213.
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put back to square one.^®
It was easy for him because he was allowed to work in the
higher echelons of the organization, as many non-African
members of the ANC do. So valuable was the information that
Williamson had given BOSS that upon arrival in South Africa
he was promoted to the position of Captain.
Other damaging informants include Jessica Monare and
Gloria Sedibe, who became known as "Comrade September”. In
1986 Comrade September exposed the ANC cadres in Swaziland
who were meant to infiltrate into South Africa.^*
Although the ANC/SACP tried to make a "clean-up" in its
ranks, it is still not clear whether the spies are totally
gotten rid of.
There were enacted laws that made it impossible for
Africans to be engaged in political activities of any sort.
In 1962 there was the Sabotage Act which, carrying a maximum
penalty of death, was directed to those who were involved in
sabotage, but it also included people involved in peaceful
actions like demonstrations. People were detained without
trial in accordance with the General Law Amendment Act of
1963. These two laws were further reinforced by the
Terrorism Act (1966) which gave the authorities power to
^^Craig Williamson, "ANC Clandestine Operations," in
Challenge: Southern Africa within the African Revolutionary
Context. A1 J. Venter, ed. (Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing
Pty., Ltd., 1989), 291.
^^For a detailed story on Comrade September, see Africa
Confidential Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 20, 1989): 7.
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arrest anyone they suspected of seeking to overthrow the
state.
As part of their counterinsurgency strategy the South
Africans moved fast to appease the Africans. Some analysts
attribute this sudden change of heart to pressures by
Western businessmen who feared for their "loans and
investments and, like many South African leaders and others,
they are looking to an alternative future and seeking
meetings with the ANC."^^ At the same time South African
militants claim that escalated attacks against SADF forced
the government to seek talks.
In the 1980s, to start their reform policies, they
abolished the pass laws. They wanted to eradicate all petty
apartheid laws while still keeping in place those which
still make the Africans powerless. For example, the
homelands are not disbanded yet, and the Africans still do
not have a vote. Other pillars of Apartheid such as the
Population Registration Act of 1950, the Black Land Act of
1913 and the Group Areas Act of 1966 are still in place.
The Population Registration Act placed all persons according
to their respective races; the Land Act prohibited Africans
^^Abdul S. Minty, "South Africa's Military Build-up:
The Region at War," in Destructive Engagement. Phyllis
Johnson and David Martin, eds. (Harare, Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe
Publishing House, 1986), 204.
28see "PAC's Army Attacks on the Increase in South
Africa," Azania News Vol. 26, No. 2 (July -August 1988): 17-
19.
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acquiring land from any other area except the reserved lands
which later were designated "homelands"; and the Group Areas
act designated residential and business places for various
races.
Perhaps the major setback that the South African regime
has set up against the liberation movements was the
developments that started in 1989. President W.F. de Klerk
started off his reform policies by releasing political
prisoners. In 1990 he released Mandela and announced a
nationwide amnesty for political exiles. Subsequently, the
unbanning of all political groups in the country led to the
suspension of armed struggle by the ANC—the PAG said that
it will continue with its struggle.
Galula points out that even if the counterinsurgent is
aware that what he offers is of little appeal at all he
"...must somehow find a set of reforms, even if secondary,
even if minor. He has to gamble that reason, in the long
run, will prevail over passion.
The same tactic was used by the Smith regime in
Rhodesia when in 1978, at the height of guerrilla activity,
he proposed an internal agreement with African leaders
making Bishop Abel Muzorewa Prime Minister of the provincial
government.
^^David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and




The government did not want to be taken by surprise as
in 1960. Thus from 1960 to 1968 the police budget increased
from R36 million to R72.1 million, while the military budget
was raised from R44 million in 1960 to almost R300 million
at the end of the decade, and by 1989 the military budget of
South Africa had reached RIO,000 million.
The army has developed to the extent that it would take
the combination of several African armies to match its
strength. The government has made it compulsory for all
white males between the ages of 17 to 60 to serve two years
of full time active duty. The response has been
overwhelming. By 1982 there were 65,000 active duty
soldiers and 100,000 active reservists and it was
anticipated that the number would rise to 250,000, and the
Commando and other forces subject to mobilization, could
make a total of 800,000 men.^^
The authorities had sought the expertise of several
Western countries to train its forces, especially the French
and Germans. Also there is evidence that the South African
military leaders have been studying literature on war in
general and insurgency and counterinsurgency in particular.
They read Von Clausewitz, Mao Tse-tung, and the works of
Andre' Beaufre' on which they based their theory of "total
^°Bunting, 274.
^^Africa Report Vol. 27, No. 3 (May-June 1982): 37.
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strategy" which calls for coordination of efforts
"throughout all fields of government policy;" and the former
military commander, General Magnus Malan, is experienced "in
guerrilla conflicts and counter-insurgency operations''^^
that he gained from the previous conflicts in Africa.
During the reign of the Portuguese in Angola and
Mozambique, and the Rhodesian settlers in what is now
Zimbabwe, the South Africans were confident that their line
of defense was secured. They were only hopeful that
Portuguese and Rhodesian territories could be held on for a
little longer, because they feared getting "involved in a
'terrorist war' within weeks.Therefore, South Africa
took the initiative and trained anti-guerrilla patrols in
the Zambezi Valley. Alliances were formed between the
colonial regions to combat 'terrorists.' For example, in
1967 when ANC and ZAPU guerrillas attempted to infiltrate
Rhodesia through the Wankie area. South African forces went
to assist the Rhodesian forces. Of the alliances between
these regions. South Africa's Prime Minister Vorster once
stated: "We are good friends with both Portugal and
Rhodesia, and good friends do not need a pact. Good friends
^^Richard Leonard, South Africa at War: White Power and
the Crisis in Southern Africa (Westport, Connecticut:
Lawrence Hill and Company, Publishers, Inc., 1983), 199.
^^Grundy, 132.
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know what their duty is if a neighbour's house is on
fire."^^ The meaning of this statement was that South
Africa would use all it takes to eradicate guerrilla
infiltration into her territory, and do all in its power to
have its borders clear of insurgency.
In 1967 the republic's president, J.B. Vorster, advised
Zambia's Kaunda (and indirectly all those who might seek to
be as outspoken as he) to
stop this braggadocio and develop your
country, because in that way it will be
to the benefit of your people and the
whole of Southern Africa. If you want
to try violence, as you have advised
other States in Africa, we will hit you
so hard that you will never forget
it.
Kaunda has been careful in his speeches after this
utterance. He since resorted to preaching peaceful
approaches to the problem in South Africa, and has offered
himself as mediator between the minority regimes of Southern
Africa and the nationalist movements fighting against them.
He occasionally met with Ian Smith of the now fallen
Rhodesia and South Africa's Vorster.
Other African states have silently agreed with Kaunda's
actions. They were psychologically defeated by South
Africa's military superiority.
2^Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 1. No. IV (September
15, 1967): 845C.
25Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 31,
1966): 468.
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This discussion on the relationship of S,A. and her
neighbors will be elaborated upon shortly. Before then we
shall exam prospects for unity between the movements.
Lack of Unity
We have already outlined the effects of disunity among
the membership of each movement in the previous chapter. We
may now turn to the hindrances of unity between the
movements themselves.
Many revolutions have, at one point or the other,
suffered due to the lack of unity between the movements
fighting the same enemy. Lack of unity has been present in
almost all the struggles in Africa, and it has been the most
troubling factor in the success of any liberation struggle.
This failure to unite is due to the fact that the Africans
themselves are first composed of varied, heterogenous
groups, before even other political and ideological factors
are considered.
Amilcar Cabral also acknowledged this fact, and went on
to describe unity as a means, and not an end. Addressing
the PAIGC cadres in 1969, Cabral said:
There are persons in this struggle of
the colonies against colonialism who up
till now are still struggling merely for
unity. Because, as they are unable to
wage the struggle, they confuse unity
with struggle. Unity is a means towards
struggle, and as with all means, a
little goes a long way. It is not
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necessary to unite all the
population.
Thus Cabral suggests that sections of the population
should be mobilized into the united front, and not the whole
populace, because a hundred percent unity is not possible.
The notion that the progress of a revolutionary
struggle could eventually bring the antagonistic movements
and their leadership together since they fight a common
enemy was popularized by Frantz Fanon. He said that
violence against an oppressive regime is the most effective
means of conquering obstacles to political unity of the
movements, that violence is the 'only work' of the colonized
people into which they put all their efforts. According to
Fanon,
...the practice of violence binds them
together as a whole, since each
individual forms a violent link in the
great chain, a part of the great
organism of violence which has surged
upwards in reaction to the settler's in
the beginning. The groups recognize
each other and the future nation is
already indivisible.^^
While Fanon's theory could not be proved correct in
Algeria,^® there are those liberation movements who made it
®®Amilcar Cabral, Unity and Struggle; Speeches and
Writings (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1979),
31.
^^Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth. 73.
^®William Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership:
Algeria, 1954-1968 (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London,
England: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), 11.
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their responsibility to fight as a united force for their
countries, and today they are governments. In Mozambique,
for instance, the many organizations which were divided
along tribal, regional, religious, linguistic, and
ideological lines came together and formed the Front for the
Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). The organizations
involved the National Democratic Union of Mozambique
(UDENAMO), Mozambique African National Union (MANU), African
Union for Mozambique's Independence (UNAMI), and COREMO.
According to Eduardo Mondlane, himself one of the leaders of
the united front, unity was possible only because the
leaders of the different organizations were willing and
prepared to work together, and they ready to exercise
"strong pressure for the formation of single united
body.
The Zimbabwean revolution also taught us that no matter
how antagonistic the movements are, their differences should
be shelved so that they could form a united front. There
were very sharp contradictions among Zimbabweans—mainly
playing around tribalism. There also were times when
leaders of the Zimbabwean revolution got involved in bloody
fights over leadership and organization. However, there were
attempts to unify, and eventually ZAJJU and ZAPU agreed to
form the Patriotic Front which ultimately won independence
^’Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique
(London: Zed Press, 1983), 118-119.
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for Zimbabwe—although tribal and ideological differences
were not eradicated.
Such developments have not been possible with the South
African liberation movements. These movements have not been
able to come together. Peter Walshe quotes Sol Plaatjie as
having said that "Failure of our race to unite is due to
failure of its leaders to unite. The demon of tribalism is
the great stumbling block to unity. And with the
•homeland' system the government reinforced that tribal
division. The leaders regard each other as enemies. In
fact, the fight that goes on between the liberation
movements is fiercer than the one they have with the South
African government. Like the leaders of the Zimbabwe
liberation struggle, the South African leaders of liberation
movements also engaged in fights in the late 1950s, to the
extent that one group would not allow the other to hold
meetings. The fight was between the Charterists and the
Africanists in the ANC.
Unity between the two movements has thus been
impossible. The elusiveness of unity between ANC and PAC is
mainly ideological, and none of the two movements want to
compromise their position. The ANC maintains that the
united front that it has formed with the organizations in
the Congress Alliance—comprising the Indian Congress, the
Coloured Congress, Congress of Democrats and the Communist
'^°Walshe, 213.
103
Party—is one which would eventually bring the total
independence of the South Africans. The ANC has repeatedly
said that it is already 'united in action' with these
organizations, and should any organization see any need for
unity that organization should be prepared to work within
the Congress Alliance. This is a deliberate utterance
because the Congress Alliance is the reason for the split by
the Africanists some of whom eventually formed PAC.
The PAC's case is that it cannot unite with ANC because
the organizations in the Alliance want to reduce the
situation in South Africa to a Civil Rights struggle, while
it holds that the struggle is against settler-colonialism.
It said that the struggle cannot be limited to the fight
against racial discrimination. Therefore, as far as the PAC
is concerned, the Freedom Charter cannot be the basis for
that unity since it is not addressing the fundamental
problem that is facing the Africans.
Indeed the ANC was lost in the Congress Alliance. Its
constitution was no longer referred to, but only the Freedom
Charter became the program of the ANC in the Alliance.
Galula warns that a united front might "include dubious
allies whose use must be curbed short of the point where
they can endanger the basic program of the insurgent", that
the allies must be gotten rid of as soon as the party gets
established. Instead, in the case of the ANC, the movement
became weaker and weaker, and fell in the hands of the
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Communists. In order to reduce the risk of being swallowed
in a united front, Galula advises,
the party must always remain a 'bloc
without' in any coalition. It can enter
an alliance with other parties, but it
must never merge with them. It cannot
absorb them, either; but unreliable
elements must be grouped in the party's
front organizations.'*^
However, attempts were made by exile leaders in Ghana
in April 1960 when they formed the South African United
Front. It consisted of delegates from the PAC, ANC, SAIC,
and the South West African National Union (SWANU).
According to Carter and Karis the PAC leaders did not take
it seriously while the ANC were happy about it, but with
encouragement from "Kwame Nkrumah and other leaders, they
agreed in principle to work together...."'*^ It was this
united front which campaigned for the ouster of South Africa
from the Commonwealth.
The united front between ANC and PAC was a well-thought
of idea. It was a realization by the two organizations that
it is through working together that they could vanquish a
common enemy. But it did not last; by the beginning of 1962
it had dissolved.
Unity between the movements is impossible also because
of the "progressive nationalism" that the ANC is promoting,
''^Galula, 46-47.
''^Carter and Karis, From Protest to Challenge Vol. 3,
351.
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as concluded by the 1969 Morogoro conference. Defending its
position within the Congress Alliance the ANC leaders had
this to say: "...our nationalism must not be confused with
chauvinism or narrow nationalism of a previous epoch.
The ANC was lashing out against the (ANC) nationalists in
its ranks—and indirectly the PAC— who always have been
dissatisfied with the alliance. Further, the differences
were widened by the association of the two organizations
with the "Superpower" politics. The ANC allied itself with
the Soviet Union while the PAC, after criticizing ANC's
association, attracted Chinese support.
There was even a time when the ANC wanted the OAU "to
grant it sole recognition, pointing at the Angolan War as an
example of the dangers of having more than one recognized
movement," but the OAU insisted that they "form a united
front. However, the ANC's campaign seems to have
succeeded because many of the movements which became
governments have tended to sympathize with the ANC since
they together received support from the same source, the
Soviet Union. The ANC received its military supplies
through these countries.
Some petty issues also contributed to the division
between the two movements. The ANC feared that the PAC was




"Nkosi Sikelel'iAfrika”; they fought over the slogan
"Mayibuy'iAfrika”and the use by the PAC of ANC's green,
black and yellow flag colors, although the flags have
different designs. Generally members of each organization
would not support another on occasions of common concern,
for instance, organizing Sharpeville or June 16, 1976
commemorations.
In October 1989 the leaders who were released from gaol
per general amnesty of the W.F. de Klerk government pledged
to work towards unity. To that effect Jeff Masemola, one of
the PAC prisoners who served the longest terms on Robben
Island, visited Mandela at the Victor Verster Prison, and
there was "speculation that the question of unity between
the organizations was discussed."^
It does not seem like this will be achieved soon
because there still are disagreements which the movements
have to deal with.
In all respects the question of unity is one that needs
to be addressed soon, because the success of armed struggle
^^Nkosi Sikelel'iAfrika, which means God Bless Africa,
was composed in 1897 by Enoch Mankayi Sontoga. It is
therefore not ANC's composition. The African movements
adopted it as their National Anthem, and today several
African countries including Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania,
sing it in their respective languages. The slogan, "Mayibuye
iAfrika", means Let Africa Come Back, and the PAC used it
because they saw its relevance in the struggle for
liberation, and it agrees more with the Africanist slogan of
"Africa for Africans," than with the declaration that the
land "belongs to all who live in it."
'^^Race Relations Survey. (1989/1990): 745.
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is dependent on it. As we have already seen, a revolution
that is looking for a successful national liberation must be
able to bring together all forces prepared to topple
colonial domination.
OAU and the Frontline States
When it was formed in 1963, the O.A.U. was determined
to help in the fight against the white minority governments
of Southern Africa.Leaders of independent Africa
reasoned that as long as other parts of Africa were still
under colonial rule, independence in Africa meant nothing.
They were actually declaring war on the colonial regimes in
Africa, even though they would not say so. This was in
accordance to the Pan-African principle as preached by Kwame
Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Sekou Toure' and others.^®
To a large extent the OAU has been rhetorically
involved in the liberation of Africa. It tried to unite
liberation movements all over the continent, but failed
because it was not persistent enough. Although it is not
entirely its duty to do so, the OAU should at least have
been exemplary as a continental unifying force. We could
^^Zdenek Cervenka, "Major Policy Shifts in the
Organization of African Unity," in Foreign Relations of
Africa States, ed. K. Ingham (Buttersworth, London: 1974),
329.
^tete, C.M.B., The Search for African Unity," African
International Relations, ed. Olatunde J.C.B. Ojo, D.K. Orwa
and C.M.B. Utete (Lagos, Nigeria: Longman Nigeria Limited,
1985), 73-93.
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not, however, expect rich results from its efforts for it is
itself a conglomeration of disagreeing elements. Yashpal
Tandon tries to rescue the OAU, while at the same time
directing blame toward the minority regimes. He says:
There was no conciliatory effort by the
OAU hence it can hardly be blamed for
failure. Some of the blame might be laid
at the doorstep of the white-controlled
regimes in Southern Africa, for they
have often exploited the differences and
helped perpetuate them... [by keeping]
the leaders physically apart and thus
prevented them from meeting and
resolving their differences.^’
Tandon's suggestion that the 'white-controlled regimes'
are to blame for the disunity of these movements is not
sound; but he then realizes that and says the nationalists
themselves should take the blame. There has never been an
enemy who would help his adversary to get organized. This
is war, and in war every weakness is accordingly exploited
by each side. The ball is in the court of the movements,
although the OAU can still redouble its effort to mediate
their unity if it is prepared to.
In April 1969 the summit conference of East and Central
African States, held in Lusaka, Zambia, "...preferred 'to
negotiate, rather than destroy, to talk rather than to
kill.... If peaceful progress of emancipation were possible
or if changed circumstances were to use peaceful methods of
^’Yashpal Tandon, "African Unity and Southern African
Liberation," in Southern Africa in Perspective: Essays in
Regional Politics, ed. Christian P. Potholm and Richard Dale
(New York and London: The Free Press, 1972), 253.
109
struggle even at the cost of some compromise on timing of
change»Thus, for the past twenty three years the OAU
has not made up its mind on the struggle in South Africa.
African and Arab Ministers who attended the 1975
Special Session of the OAU in Dar es Salaam were still
divided on whether they should have relations with South
Africa or isolate her, and Kenya was the only country which
suggested total isolation. The rest seem to have heeded
Kaunda's advise to adopt "a joint proposal that allows
continued contacts with S.A. and will provide for resort to
force and widespread guerrilla warfare against white
southern African governments only as last resort."®’
This is characteristic of what has been going on in the
O.A.U. For over twenty years at this point they were not
yet agreed on a single issue in as far as the question of
colonialism [in S.A.] is concerned. The organization once
maintained that South Africa was an independent state and
that it only has to get rid of apartheid.
Nigeria, one of the few countries which have proved to
be steadfast in their opposition to Apartheid policies, has
never hesitated to challenge other OAU member states to do
the same. In 1977, when attending the 14th Ordinary Session
®°William J. Foltz and Jennifer Widner, "OAU and
Southern Africa Liberation," in The OAU After Twenty Years,
ed. Yassim El-Ayouty and I. William Zartzman (New York, NY:
Praeger Publishers, 1984), 252.
®’New York Times. August 1, 1975, p. 3.
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of the Assembly of Heads of State and government in
Libreville, Gabon, the Nigerian President told his
colleagues that they should stop accumulating weapons for
use against their citizens "instead of helping the
liberation movements in South Africa." He went on to
declare that
...A sound beginning in this direction
is a decisive action by all member-
states to ensure, even before we have
Libreville, that we shall discharge our
financial obligation to the O.A.U. and
its Liberation Committee. Let us ensure
that at least in this regard our actions
conform to our slogans. "Armed struggle
is the only solution to the African
problem." ...For it is not enough to
shout slogans and dream that the louder
we proclaim our opposition to Martheid,
more likely it will disappear.®^
Of course this fell on deaf ears. Or even if they
earnestly took heed of what the Nigerian was saying, the
other members of the OAU had serious economic problems.
However, Ghana was to make a follow-up to the
suggestion made by Nigeria in 1977. Flight-Lieutenant Jerry
Rawlings, amidst the economic ills of his country, was
prepared to make a sacrifice. In February 1984 he
campaigned among other OAU member countries for "concerted
military action against South Africa" and his country's
African youth brigade is said to have "called for the
formation of an 'interim volunteer African force' to fight
^^Zdenek Cervenka, "OAU's Year of Disunity," Africa
Contemporary Record (1977/1978); A65.
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in South Africa."®^ This has not taken place too. As a
group the OAU countries have never taken a firm stand
together.
And after all, the liberation movements should not
expect the AAU to fight for their freedom.
The African Liberation Committee
For a long time the one problem the African Liberation
Committee struggled with has been the lack of constant flow
of funds. The OAU has set itself certain policies to which
some members did not adhere. Some members have not been
consistent in their annual contributions to the OAU For
example, when in 1964 it "established a special fund into
which member states" were to contribute every year to raise
at least $2.1 million, only three countries (Tanzania,
Uganda, and Zambia) abided by the OAU's ruling.The
Thirtieth Regular Session of the OAU Liberation Committee
held in Libya in 1978, in addition to calling for the
advancement of decolonization of Southern Africa, appealed
for more money from its members and other sympathetic
governments and organizations. Only a few African countries
have cooperated with the OAU in as far as contributing to
the liberation fund was concerned.
^^Race Relations Survey (1989/1990): 857-858.
^^Kenneth W. Grundy, 195.
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Allocation of funds had no particular criterion. Any
liberation movement, regardless of its ideological outlook,
could get funding. But often liberation movements have
complained about lack of money and military supplies, and
have turned to outside forces like the Soviets and the
Chinese.
The ALC's interference with the strategy for the
liberation of Southern Africa took the struggle in South
Africa back. It reasoned that the liberation struggle in
Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe should be fought before
that of South West Africa and South Africa.It was
thought that in so doing the liberated territories would
then provide sanctuary nearer South African borders—a
commitment which has been enfeebled by South African threat,
anyway. This had been a great setback, especially for the
PAC whose other sources of funds and materials are not as
established as those of the ANC/CP. Besides, it gave the
South African strategists enough time to prepare.
Pressure exerted on the liberation movements (on the
continent as a whole) by the OAU and its Liberation
Committee—and other donors—have been overbearing for these
movements, and it has often led the movements to act in ways
which were suicidal. For the movements to stay recognized
by the OAU and its ALC they are required to prove they are
actually engaged in battle. As a results some movements
^^Southern Africa in Perspective. 254.
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have engaged in military missions which they otherwise were
not prepared for. For example, fearing derecognition, the
ANC has sent in many of its trained young men inside the
country without even having created links with the home
front. The result was that many were arrested or even
killed by the South African forces.
Several African movements were derecognized because
they could not prove to be effective, in accordance with the
principles set forth by the ALC. The PAG, for instance, has
been derecognized twice already, because it could not solve
its internal problems or prove to the Liberation Committee
that it has been in the battlefield. The PAG fell under the
category of those movements which were regarded by the ALC
as 'unrepresentative' and 'ineffective'.
Harassment of Frontline States (by S.A.)
South Africa continually attacked countries such as
Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia and
Zimbabwe, because she (S.A.) claimed that these countries
were providing shelter to (or allowing their territories to
be used as springboard against S.A. by) South African
freedom fighters.
The emergence of independent African neighboring states
left South Africa without a potential buffer area. Feeling
the threat of growing insurgency, the minority regime
created excuses to attack its neighbors. One such excuse
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was keeping the region free of communism. All the neighbors
that fought against the settler regimes had declared
themselves as either Marxist or Socialist, and since they
were fresh from the bush they could be potential havens for
guerrillas.
Apart from using its commando raids into neighboring
countries the regime always had friends in the dissidents
who were not satisfied with the new governments; and to stop
the invasions S.A. would force the countries into signing
treaties.
In the case of Mozambique the regime supplied (National
Resistance Movement) RENAMO, or MNR. To neutralize
Mozambique forever, the white minority regime had it
conclude the Nkomati Accord on March 16, 1984, where it was
agreed that the South Africans cease supporting RENAMO and
Mozambique the ANC.®^ In conjunction with the United
States, South Africa supported UNITA against the Angolan
government, and the two forced the Angolan government to
sign a peace treaty that had as its conditions evacuating
the ANC guerrillas and the Cubans from Angola before Namibia
could be let loose.Against Zimbabwe the regime had what
came to be known as "Super-ZAPU", (ZAPU dissidents who with
aid from South Africa wanted to depose Robert Mugabe's
^^Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, "Mozambique: To
Nkomati and Beyond," Destructive Engagement. 27-41.
®^Idem, "Zimbabwe: Apartheid's Dilemma," in Destructive
Engagement. 58.
115
government), but unlike in the two cases above, ZAPU and the
Zimbabwean government reached a compromise.
This was part of the overall strategy to economically
destabilize the region—in the name of stopping the
guerrillas.
Despite the fact that these countries, particularly
those close to the Republic, supported the movements
diplomatically and morally, they suffered heavily at the
hands of the South African Defense Force.
Where possible the regime organized military overthrow
of radical leaders. In the 1960s South Africa helped Leabua
Jonathan to stage a coup against Ntsu Mokhehle.^® And when
he became stubborn, S.A. had him replaced in 1986 by Justine
Lekhanya.
Economic Blackmail
Economic blackmail is another of the methods used by
South Africa to intimidate her neighbors. Many of the so-
called Frontline States are economically dependent on South
Africa. They feared isolation by South Africa, so that
^®Richard F. Weisfelder, "Lesotho,” in Southern Africa
in Perspective. 126-128.
^^Louis A. Picard and Robert Groelsma, "Beyond
Constructive Engagement: US Foreign Policy Toward Southern
Africa into the 1990s," in South Africa in Southern Africa:
Domestic Chance and International Conflict ed. Edmond J.
Keller and Louis A. Picard (Boulder and London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1989), 245. See also Rok Ajulu and Diana
Cammack, "Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland: Captive States,"
Destructive Engagement. 141.
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harboring so-called terrorists was detrimental to their
survival.
The white minority government of South Africa has
always played on the half-hearted, ever-flinching support
that the OAU countries give to the liberation movements of
that country, and most of all the double-standard politics
most of these countries have been involved in. For there
are those countries which would agree with other members of
the OAU on issues that concern South Africa, and on the fact
that that country should be boycotted in every way while at
the same time they make other deals with South Africa.
South Africa has not hidden the fact that there are
countries which were betraying their OAU brothers. In 1982
the Boers bragged that it traded "with 47 of the 51 O.A.U.
nations despite their hostility to the white regime" and it
was also reported "an indication of expanded trade was the
1981 statistic showing that 49,463 people from Africa
visited South Africa on business trips....Even
Zimbabwe, which is supposed to be radical, received 25% of
its imports from S.A.^^ Tanzania, home to the African
Liberation Committee, was reported to have admitted to its
dependence on South Africa’s maize.
'^°Africa Report Vol. 27, No. 4 (May-June 1982): 42.
^^Ibid.
^^Leonard Thompson and Andrew Prior, South African
Politics (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1982), 227.
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When they became independent, most of the African
countries had very weak economic infrastructures and they
could not help but look down south for survival. For some,
the economic ties that existed between South Africa and
their colonial governments were not really broken. For
instance, all of the immediate neighbors of South Africa,
including Zambia, Tanzania, and Malawi cannot do without the
republic's trade relations. Even their regional economic
efforts (in organizations such as Southern African
Development Coordinating Committee [SADCC], and Preferential
Trade Area [PTA]), have not accorded them the strength to
stop that dependence on SA.'^^ To export their goods they
would have them pass through South Africa's ports.South
Africa is providing work (in mining, agricultural,
manufacturing industries) to thousands of citizens from
these territories.
The position of the landlocked countries—Swaziland,
Botswana and Lesotho—leaves them with no choice but to be
beggars at the doorstep of South Africa. For two weeks, in
December 1992, after the Maseru Massacre S.A. virtually
halted Lesotho's economy when trucks supplying food to
Lesotho's stores and hotels were not allowed to enter that
^^Reginald H. Green and Carol B. Thompson, "Political
Economies in Conflict: SADCC, South Africa and Sanctions,"
in Destructive Engagement. 261-280.
^Ibid. See also C.M.B. Utete, "Foreign Policy and the
Developing State," in African International Relations. 43.
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country.Foodstuffs got spoiled while people went hungry
because of lack of food in the food stores.^ For a few
days South Africa would not let Lesotho fly its planes
across her air space, threatening to bring down any plane
that dared to defy her wishes.
The condition set forth by the South African
authorities was that Lesotho government evacuate South
African refugees who, according to these authorities, posed
a threat to the security of the racist state. A list of 60
names of exiles deemed undesirable by the South Africans was
submitted to the Lesotho government.*^ These individuals
were deported to Zimbabwe, Angola, and Ethiopia, although
newspaper reports have said that they were taken to some
unspecified African countries.
Hostility Towards Guerrillas
Occasionally, the neighboring states have proved to be
hostile to the liberation movements. To this position they
were forced by their dependence on South Africa. Guerrillas
passing through some of these neighboring states have been
harassed by the police of these territories.





They are in the habit of intercepting, arresting and
disarming insurgents, and in some cases give them to the
South African police. In 1981 Lesotho police arrested
guerrillas in possession of arms; two of these men,
according to Louis Le Grange, the S.A.P. boss, were involved
in the 198 0 sabotage of the Sasol oil-from-coal plant.
Botswana was to arrest commander of Mkhonto, Joe Modise, and
Cassius Make apparently having with them a layout for
military missions for 1982.*^’
At the end of that year ANC houses in Lesotho were
attacked, leading to the Maseru Massacre. Another setback
was that many militants were for a long time unable to leave
Angola due to the disruption the arrest caused.
Fortunately, Modise and Make were not handed over to the
S.A.P.
This wavering attitude of the OAU and the Frontline
States should also be corrected if armed struggle is to
succeed in South Africa. Their cooperation is very crucial.
The OAU has not been able to supply the answer to the
question of those countries which have relations with the
minority regimes. Hence, these countries acted in the way
they had. In 1971, the Seventh Summit Conference of East
and Central African States held in Mogadishu, Somalia,
'^Africa Report Vol. 26, No. 4 (July-August, 1981): 34.
^’See Africa Confidential Vol. 30, No. 17 (25 August,
1989) : 3.
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referred to the behavior of other member-states as
"treason." The summit condemned countries which had
relations with South Africa, charging that they
have betrayed the cause of the African
liberation struggle. This treason is
incompatible with the status of a member
of this conference and the countries in
question should consider with-drawing
from our conference unless they decide
to break their links with the minority
regimes of oppression in Southern
Africa. . . .^°
%
During the 1972 Eighth Summit Conference of East and
Central Africa States held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the
ministers were reminded that they still have to reconsider
their commitment to Pan-Africanism. Speaking as a
representative of liberation movements, the Vice President
of FRELIMO, Marcelino Dos Santos, told the conference that
"the struggle to liberate the countries still under colonial
rule was a struggle of the whole continent.
But none of this was put into practice. And the
guerrillas from South Africa have continued to be arrested
(if spotted) by the neighboring states. As we have
indicated many members of the liberation movements who have
been deported are now prohibited immigrants.
^°Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 8, No. 10 (November 15,1971): 2248.




Past revolutions have already demonstrated the
importance of bases and reliance on the masses, especially
the village dwellers. Support of the masses is one of the
basic conditions for the success of any armed struggle.
Thus from China to Vietnam, from Algeria to Guinea Bissau,
from Mozambique to Angola and to Zimbabwe, the masses have
been active in bringing about their own freedom.^
The village base areas are supposed to be nerve centers
of the guerrillas. They would not only provide the
guerrilla group with the supplies, but also the masses,
after political work has been done among them, would gather
intelligence information for the cadres. A successful
guerrilla warfare depends at all times on the creation of
bases, an activity that results from constant political
education.
This lack of bases translates itself into lack of
popular support, and thus a weakness exploited by the
counter-insurgents to isolate the revolutionaries from the
masses. In this way the military power of the guerrillas
^^Eqbal Ahmad, "Revolutionary Warfare: How To Tell When
the Rebels Have Won," Nation (August 30, 1965): 97-98.
^For a detailed treatment of the importance of the
masses see Mao Tse Tung's Selected Military Writings.
Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963, and Selected works.
Vol. 1, New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1954.
^^See Mao Tse Tung, Selected Military Writings.
(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963).
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cannot be established. The masses give substance to every
guerrilla warfare because they guarantee the success of that
type of war in every way.
Thus, a guerrilla war's initial objective should be to
win over the masses so as to facilitate the creation of a
base. A guerrilla group without a base is almost useless
and, as Mao once said, will be reduced to roaming bandits.
The basic mistake that the movements have committed was
their tendency to want to fight for the African masses. The
guerrillas wanted to enter South Africa from the neighboring
states and start fighting. There is little evidence that
these forces have learned from the other past revolutions.
Ronnie Kasrils revealed in 1988 that sending militants home
was due to the growing impatience in the ranks, while at the
same time he admits that an internal network could have
established a springboard for the returning trainees:
...the presence of a large guerrilla
force outside the country, waiting to
come to the defense of the people and
punish the enemy has, I feel, clouded
our vision. In the pragmatic sense, the
need to deploy cadres of Umkhonto at
home for Combat work could not wait on
the reconstruction of our internal
underground.^ '
Kasrils was at one point reiterating some points of the
1985 Kabwe Consultative Conference in Zambia which concluded
that there was no need to change the ANC strategy of sending
^Ronnie Kasrils, "The Revolutionary Army," Sechaba
(March 1988): 3-4.
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the 'boys' to the cities, but send even more after
establishing an underground network.^*
The insurgents in South Africa have not been able to
create internal bases from which they could operate. The
arrest of leaders and the constant intimidation of the
masses by the authorities left the organizations without
bases inside the country. The underground operations,
especially those in the townships (since the movements were
concentrated there) were closely monitored by the informer
system. This has been a great hindrance to both the ANC and
PAC for their trained personnel had no where to get to once
they reached South Africa.
Reliance on the Urban Areas
There has been lack of planning on the part of the
liberation movements, and this weakness is attributable to
the tactics employed by the strategists of the movement.
The guerrillas who infiltrated into South Africa were taking
a one way ticket. Their aim was to fight, if possible, and
not do political work among the masses, but they never did
because on most occasions they were disarmed, apprehended,
and most of the time killed by the enemy soldiers.
^^For some of the issues discussed during the Kabwe
Conference see Morgan Norval, Inside the ANC. 34-34.
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This is so because the guerrillas' first and last stop
is in the cities. It is important to note that this happens
to the guerrillas of both ANC and PAC, but most of the time
to those of ANC's Mkhonto, which has registered most
suburban sabotage activities. So, whether or not they
succeeded in whatever mission assigned them their retreat is
almost impossible since they would in no time be besieged by
the police. Seventy-five percent of all the trained
personnel infiltrated South Africa at one time or the other
since 1977 have been located and arrested by the South
African police.
All this is attributable to the fact that the network
cord that linked the external and the internal missions was
cut. We have already indicated that internally security was
tightened, and all underground establishments of the
movements were crushed through prolonged detentions of
leaders and general suppression of the African population.
Sometimes the guerrillas, because of their undisguised
nervousness as a result of their long stay out of the
country, led to their own arrest. And at times they were
sent to missions in areas where they were totally unknown so
that they could not be recognized by persons who might
otherwise alert the police of their presence.
While the tactic of going to the cities had its
advantages, it accounts for more disadvantages. For
example, the men who were caught up in the 1980 "Silverton
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siege”,^ although one of them was from Pretoria, they were
not familiar with the Silverton area. Had they known the
area well, they would have had enough sense not to go to the
Volkskas Bank in the first place, because only few blocks
from the bank is a police headquarters. Another case in
point is that of Solomon Mahlangu who was sent to the
gallows even though he did not use his weapon in congruence
with the ANC policy of sparing "soft targets."^ Mahlangu,
originally from Mamelodi, Pretoria, was apprehended by the
police after he and his two comrades were spotted by the
police in Johannesburg; he lagged behind while attempting to
retreat.
It is not clear whether the other two retreated
successfully, for as we have noted, there is the danger of
being apprehended by police in the neighboring countries.
Thus the failure of guerrilla warfare waged by South
African militants particularly those of Umkhonto we Sizwe
results from the fact that once they reached the cities they
are not received by anyone. All the links had been
disrupted in the sixties and there were no efforts to
reestablish them.
Criticizing the reliance on guerrilla warfare in the
urban centers, Fidel Castro is said to have exclaimed that
^John D. Brewer, After Soweto (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986) 87, citing Transvaal Post. (11 April 1979).
^Ibid., 85.
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"the city is a cemetery of the revolutionaries and
resources."^’ It is in the cities where the machinery of
the police is concentrated. Elaborating on Castro's point
Debray says that
city terrorism cannot assume any
decisive role, and it entails certain
dangers of political order. But if it
is subordinate to the fundamental
struggle, the struggle in the
countryside, it has, from the military
point of view, strategic value; it
mobilizes thousands of enemy soldiers,
it ties up most of the repressive
mechanism in unrewarding tasks of
protecting factories, bridges, electric
generators, public buildings, highways,
oil pipelines—these can keep busy as
much as three quarters of the
Besides, the city does not provide basic necessities for the
guerrilla—a hideout, for instance. To hide, guerrillas
depended on the spontaneous actions of the urban population,
which could not be wholly relied upon, anyway, since they
soon die away.
One-sided Recruitment
Recruitment of fighters in South Africa has been
concentrated in urban townships—from among school children;'
there has not been enough recruitment from among countryside
dwellers. Mao Tse-tung, and other revolutionaries after




how, if well educated in the direction of the party, it
would eventually lead the revolution. On this score Mao had
this to say:
The leadership of the poor peasants is
absolutely necessary. Without the poor
peasants there can be no revolution. To
reject them is to reject the revolution.
To attack them is to attack the
revolution.®^
At the same time he cautions about those peasants who would
be undesirable, but who through party propaganda could be
won over. Going to the cities and fighting in isolation of
the masses leads us to conclude that the guerrillas are
themselves not well trained to educate the masses.
Or, even though they could be educated, there is the
barrier of language and culture that the guerrillas face.
Having spent their lives in the urban townships, the youths
cannot communicate with the village dwellers in a convincing
way. The first villages that the guerrillas get into from
the North are Venda villages. Venda-speaking people are few
in the liberation movements. So, guerrillas are left with
no choice but to avoid contact with the villagers so that
they can reach the cities undetected.
Often, the older men in the villages would not want to
be addressed by young men. As in the Transkei—where the
PAG liked sending its militants—old men demanded that the
older men should come to the region. The young militants
®^Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works Vol. 1 (New York:
International Publishers Co., Inc., 1954), 32.
128
would be required to circumcise as the men would not
conference with "Amankwenkwe," Xhosa for young boys,
generally referring to the uncircumcised.
Thus this tactical blunder led to the militants from
the Transvaal areas showing reluctance going to the Cape
Province and instead end up in the Transvaal cities.
It is not up to the guerrillas to decide that the
masses will be endangered. They should not ponder over this
problem because eventually the masses will have to fight and
die—and win, if well directed, of course. Government
reprisal is always there, whether or not the guerrillas are
fighting. The actions of the African township dwellers show
that although the government can intensify its methods of
repression the oppressed become more drawn to the
understanding of their own oppression and the more they
resist the regime.
Should the guerrillas fight therefore, they will be
assured of the mobilization of the masses because by further
repressing them the more the masses become antagonistic
against the government. As Grundy puts it,
...The longer the fighting continues,
whether or not military "victories" are
registered, the better become the
chances of convincing the peasantry that
guerrilla warfare can win. Second,
fighting is catalytic. It sets in
motion a set of actions and reactions
that increase political consciousness,
grievances, economic dislocation, and
governmental repression: just what the
guerrillas want. Unwittingly, the
government, in a sense, takes over the
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responsibility of educating and
radicalizing the masses....®^
Unfortunately it is not happening in this way in South
Africa because the guerrillas are not fighting, and since
they are allergic to the countryside they cannot reach the
village people who so much need this "radicalizing".
The only way to undermine an enemy is by engaging and
making him incur both human and nonhuman costs. The
guerrilla should always know that he is fighting from a
position of weakness and that his survival, or salvation,
lies in his ability to minimize the strength of the enemy,
which is far more powerful than guerrilla units. He in this
way not only wins the confidence of the masses, but he also
creates for himself enough room for maneuver. This is all
possible only through the creation of bases in the
countryside.
The foregoing chapter sought to discuss the weaknesses
associated with the inhibitions of armed struggle in South
Africa. Looked at from any angle, the success of the
liberation struggle there weighs more on the readiness of
the nationalist leaders to rectify their mistakes. Thus
far, the break in the link between externally based
movements and the home front has led to competition between
the external leadership and the generation of militant




REFLECTIONS ON THE PRESENT SITUATION
The changes that are taking place in South Africa have
very little to do with the pressure exerted by the
externally based liberation movements. They are to a great
extent the results of the internal efforts of the African
masses which began as early as 1968 with the formation of
the Black Consciousness movement (BCM), although right now
the liberation movements, especially the ANC, parade as the
leadership of the movement that brought about those
changes.
The movements have so far disappointed many people in
the home front. They caused confusion and did nothing in
the direction of armed struggle. In 1988, for instance,
trade unionists noted ANC's meddling in the affairs of the
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and
suggested that the ANC should just back off.^
The liberation movements have wasted too many chances
to strike a hard blow on the South African government. Many
opportunities availed themselves, beginning with the workers
strikes of 1973 and 1974, throughout the 'Viva Frelimo
Rallies', and the Soweto Uprisings in 1976 and 1977. It was
during these periods that BCM embarked on the mental
preparation of the masses for a major onslaught by the
^See Africa Confidential Vol. 29, No. 5 (March 4,
1988): 1.
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guerrilla movements, although it was not the manifest
objective of this organization. Starting in 1968, the BCM,
through the South African Students Organization (SASO),
Black People's Convention (BPC), and the Black Community
Projects (BCP), filled the void that was left by the banning
of these movements in the early sixties. In 1978 Azania
People's Organization (AZAPO) carried on from where the BCM
left off after it was banned in 1977.
The 1984/1986 rebellion was also a moment which the
guerrillas could have seized to intensify the struggle, or
even take over the government. Unlike the 1976/1977
rebellion which concentrated itself in the urban townships,
that in the eighties covered a greater geographic area that
included the countryside. The community development
projects of the BCM included, among others, leadership
training courses, literacy and educational classes, candle
and soap-making. Many university students organized health
projects like mobile clinics, and in King Williamstown there
was the Zanempilo Clinic Steve Biko helped to run. This was
one of the aims of BCM because the movement's activities
were to the effect that self-reliance was stressed,
especially in the rural areas.^
Virtually everyone except, of course, the homeland
leaders and the informers and the African business
^For more information on the history and activities of
the Black Consciousness Movement, see Donald Woods Biko (New
York: Paddington Press, 1978).
132
community, was involved. With the formation of the United
Democratic Front (UDF), which the ANC wanted to claim as its
internal front, the African people had organized leadership
which directed the masses' energies. There was political
consciousness everywhere which could be identified by
workers' strikes, rent strikes, school boycotts, and
consumer boycotts.^
But the guerrilla movements proved to be ill-prepared
for a fight—each event seems to have taken them by
surprise.
In the process, however, the situation got out of hand.
Winnie Mandela was allowed to lead the youths in burning to
death those who were suspected to be sell-outs. She was
heard at a funeral in 1986 saying: "With our boxes of
matches and our necklaces we shall liberate this country",
and in another instance she told youths: "I want to remind
you about the power you have... the weapon you are using,
the necklace".^ The ANC has condoned what was happening.
In the words of Thabo Mbeki the deaths of these people was
the "cleansing the waters in which the fish (guerrillas)
must swim."® Many of the people who lost their lives were
^Robert M. Price, The Apartheid State in Crisis:
Political Transformation in South Africa. 1975-1990. (New York
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 202-215.
^See Norval, 112.
®Ibid., 178, citing F.M. Clifford-Vaughn, "Terrorist
Activities of the African National Congress," in
Conservative Review Vol. 1, No. 1 (February 1990): 17.
133
not even sell-outs. They were victims of "elements" who
wanted to "settle personal feuds.This was nothing but
another sign of failure on the part of the ANC.
Both the PAC and the ANC have always claimed to be
engaged in a protracted war, although neither of the two
organizations, as we have seen, has shown any continued ties
with the people. They both have embraced Mao Tse Tung's
strategy on peoples' war, and the BCM was doing what was
expected in people's war—politicizing and organizing the
masses along the lines of self-reliance. In short, these
two guerrilla movements failed to marry theory and practice.
The Question of Negotiations
When in 1989 the government announced that it was going
to release the Robben Island prisoners, including Nelson
Mandela who was now at Pollsmoor prison outside Cape Town,
the movements became ecstatic as though it was the release
of the political prisoners that was their ultimate goal.
When finally Nelson Mandela was released, the liberation
movements unbanned, and de Klerk promised that his
government was ready to negotiate with African leaders, the
ANC announced that it was suspending armed struggle.
Armed struggle, or violence, as Fanon has shown, is the
only effective weapon of the oppressed and need not be
compromised, more so when the oppressed are still under
^Price, 210.
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domination. Proposing to go to the negotiating table was
premature, and itself a sign of weakness and failure. This
proposal came at a time when the internal situation in South
Africa was ripe for full scale armed struggle—indication
that the internal front organizations have worked tirelessly
in preparation of that struggle.^
The internal movements like the United Democratic Party
(UDF), have linked the activities of workers', students' and
parents' associations; and "comrades", by "utilizing the
hit-and-run tactics of the guerrilla, armed with petrol
bombs, paving stones, and the occasional gun, they sought to
nullify Pretoria's control of the townships."®
Generally, the South African youths feel betrayed by
the leadership, and they are the most hit by the sudden
compromise. These youths feel that their militancy has been
taken for granted. The ANC has in recent years lured the
youths into believing that revolution and education are
separable. Its slogan, "LIBERATION BEFORE EDUCATION", had
almost all young people of school-going age abandoning their
studies and dedicating their lives to full-time
participation as 'revolutionaries'. For instance, between
1983 and 1985, 700, 000 students boycotted school and
swelled "the ranks of militant youths available to..."
^Price, 152-193.
®Ibid., 192-193. See also Philip Brooks and Ivor
Powell, "Taming the Young Lions," Mother Jones (June 1990),
26.
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When inbecome the "militant vanguard" of the rebellion.’
June 1990 Mandela urged the youths to return to school,
"...there were murmurings of discontent...."’° For the ANC
this was revolution, because it agreed with its tactic of
rendering South Africa "ungovernable". However, that slogan
has now been changed to "EEDUCATION FOR LIBERATION."”
When Mandela was released and he preached non-violence
and peaceful negotiations, this group, known as the "Young
Lions", became very angry with him because they thought that
he would speed up the armed struggle. They felt that
Mandela and his cohorts are giving up the struggle too soon.
Before the release of Mandela, during the mass
demonstrations and rebellion of the mid eighties, the youths
were taught not to compromise. They have always been
inspired by the UDF slogan: LONG LIVE THE SPIRIT OF NO
COMPROMISE! so that telling them to compromise, as Mandela
was doing, was almost impossible.The youths were also
angry with the external leaders who were given temporary
indemnity to enter the country. They saw them as having
failed. For instance, the PAC's youth wing, the Azanian
National Youth Unity (AZANYU), condemned these leaders who






for a constituent assembly" and threatened that anyone who
dared negotiate will die, as it was suggestive in their "one
negotiator, one bullet" chant.
Other organizations—the PAG, Azania People's
Organization (AZAPO), Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom
Party, and the white supremacist organizations—do not
approve of the hurried wish of the ANC to have talks with
the government. After having participated in the plenary
meetings for the Convention for a Democratic South Africa
(CODESA), which is supposed to pave way for a constitution
for a new S.A., the PAG withdrew from further participation
claiming that the ANC has had secret meetings with the
government long before December 1991. It was discovered
that the ANC, through Mandela, had talks with the government
as early as 1986 to negotiate a peaceful solution to the
South African problem. (The ANC also countered that the PAC
had meetings with the government).
However, the PAC, although it welcomed the move by the
government (the release of prisoners and unbanning of the
political organizations), said that it was still committed
to continuing
the struggle for liberation on all
fronts, including armed struggle...that
the PAC would not negotiate with the
government unless negotiations were
preceded by an election for a
’^Joe Tlholoe, "No Negotiators—and Not Many Bullets
Either," Work in Progress Vol. 72 (January/February 1991):
14.
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constituent assembly on the basis of
one person one vote on a common voters'
roll in a unitary state.
The PAC's position has always been that of non¬
collaboration with the government hence it was not attracted
to the negotiating tcible. In 1986, the PAC had this to say
concerning negotiations:
All suggestions between the racist
regime and the oppressed Azanians fall
flat on the crucial question of the
basic purpose of such an exercise....
Our own rejection of dialogue or
negotiations rests on the
unacceptability of any peace talks that
cannot center on the total abandonment
of the present settler-colonial
political system plus the full
realization of the inalienable right to
self-determination by the indigenous
African majority in our country.’^
The organization is showing its disapproval of negotiations
by terrorizing the police. Its armed wing, Azania People's
Liberation Army (APIA), was recently reported to have killed
some policemen. The PAC's National Organizer, Maxwell
Newavelevethu, commented on the APIA killings saying that
the police is one of the South African departments that are
entrusted with the oppression and terrorism of the Africans
there.
’^Ibid., 15.
^^Azania Combat 1 (1986): 4.
i*"PAC Will Not Condemn Killings," Southern Africa
Review Vol. 4, No. 2 (February, 1992): 7.
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AZAPO did not want anything to do with CODESA talks
because in as far as it is concerned participants in such a
forum are betraying the national liberation struggle.
Inkatha, which constitutes the majority of membership among
the African organizations, feels that the ANC wants to treat
it as though it was not existing. This attitude led to the
death of thousands of Africans because the two organizations
started fighting. For a while attention was concentrated on
trying to stop the fratricide that plagues the African.
However, neither organization, nor the government, has
succeeded in bringing to an end the killings whose toll has
reached thousands.
Generally the African leadership has shown that it is
in a helpless position and it repeatedly blamed the regime
for the violence, and appealed to the de Klerk government to
stop it. In this way it suggests that the Pretoria regime
can effect whatever change there could be in that country.
There is still great dissatisfaction among the two
racial groups. Among the whites there are those
conservatives who do not see themselves succumbing to
African leadership. To undermine de Klerk's efforts to
reform there has been a growing demand for firearms by
paramilitary groups who have taken responsibility of
patrolling white neighborhoods in anticipation of attacks by
Africans. These conservatives are organizing vigilantes to
prepare for engagement in a bloody war against Africans.
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They are ready to fight for their 'fatherland', which cause
they claim de Klerk has betrayed.’^ These groups have
training facilities inside the country, and training is
extended to women and children. Eugene Terreblanche, leader
of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), a resistance
group, indicated recently in an interview with ABC that the
Africans will have to fight to get the land. He said: "If
they want to take this land by force and violence, we will
meet them with the barrel of the gun, and level them to the
ground."’® Violence by the AWB is at the moment limited to
the destruction of buildings, and several cases of violence
directed to Africans have been reported.
Even in the police and armed forces there are those
fascist groups who still are not convinced of what the
government plans are. To this day the de Klerk government
has not been able to control the violent activities of these
groups. ”
The situation is generally volatile. Housing for the
Africans is still insufficient.^® Unemployment for young
’^New York Times. April 29, 1990.
’®Peter Jennings, ABC World News Tonight with Peter
Jennings (March 6, 1992).
’’Christopher Wren, "Study of Violence Dividing
Pretoria," New York Times. June 3, 1992, p. 5(A).
^°T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: MacMillan
Academic and Professional Ltd., 1991), 308-390 passim. See
also Work in Progress 72 (January/February 1991), 28-31.
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Africans is rising faster than any other time. There is
also crisis in the education of the Africans.Although
there are signs of integration in schools, many Africans
cannot afford to take their children to the integrating
schools in town.^^ Besides, those schools which are for
integration are under sabotage attacks from radical white
groups. Many African students are still in the streets, and
there are no immediate plans to correct the situation.
The political situation is experiencing a stalemate.
For the talks to continue, the negotiating parties should
agree to majority rule, which proposal is difficult for the
minority white regime to swallow. In the 1980's the
Nationalist Party's thinking was that there is no such thing
as a majority in South Africa. President P.W. Botha, de
Klerk's predecessor, is quoted as saying that "South Africa
is not a country with a black majority and a small minority
of white people."^ This is in line with the Nationalist
thinking of protecting the minority from the majority. What
the Nationalists had in mind in the eighties was the
creation of communities with governments of their own so
that each could determine its "own affairs". The
^^Mokubung Nkomo, "The Current Crisis in Education and
the Challenge of The Future," SASPOST Vol. 2, No. 1 (May
1991) : 5. See also Price, Apartheid State in Crisis. 109-
110.
^^Sithole, Enoch, "Education in the 'New South
Africa'," SASPOST Vol. 2, No. 4 (September 1991): 1-7.
^Price, 142.
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Conservative Party shares the same notion. But this
"community self-determination", as planned by the
Nationalist Party, suggests that minority regime will"
maintain control over many important resources even under
circumstances of a universal, nonracial franchise.
On the other hand the liberation movements and leaders
of at least three Bantustans have indicated that
negotiations can only go on if the principle of the majority
is considered.
International Opinion
Coupled with the internal pressure was the worldwide
withdrawal of investments by international businesses. The
campaigns started after the 1976 SOWETO uprisings, and grew
in impact during the 1984/86 rebellion. Before 1976
Transnationals "had invested heavily in the South African
economy, and their capital and technology played a central
role in the modernization and maturation of the South
African industrial system."^® But the period after SOWETO
changed this trend because investors would not risk their
investments, and in 1977 major US and British corporations





Groups such as TransAfrica have been instrumental in
urging US corporations to withdraw from South Africa. An
African-American lobbying organization led by Randall
Robinson, TransAfrica managed to get students, church
ministers, labor organizations, and other congressmen
"picket” the South African Embassy in Washington and
consulates around the country; so that between 1984 and 1986
many state and city governments had to sell their
investments.^^ Over 90 American corporations, including
banks such as Chase Manhattan, withdrew their funds from
apartheid South Africa.^®
Internationally, Mandela and President F.W. De Klerk
have been raised to positions of heroes. Many countries,
especially western countries, intend to lift sanctions
against South Africa despite repeated appeals by African
nationalists to wait until the government has met the
preconditions discussed in the Harare Declaration of 1991.
The recent 28th Commonwealth Heads of Governments
Summit held in Harare, Zimbabwe, was more concerned with
ending or continuing sanctions, and less on the new
(proposed) government.^’ Britain has already made up its
mind about the sanctions. After having met with the South
^^A History of South Africa. 223.
2®lbid.
^See Andrew Meldrum, "Banquets and Banter," Africa
Report (January-February, 1992): 52-54.
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African president, United States' President George Bush
announced recently that his countiy was convinced that the
developments in South Africa were positive and, therefore,
sanctions should be lifted. Other western EEC countries
also do not see any harm in lifting sanctions. In April
1991 the European Community resumed trade relations with
South Africa following Japan's decision to do so "in view of
Pretoria's move to dismantle apartheid.South Africa
has been very strategic, economically (and otherwise), for
these countries.
The OAU and Frontline States cannot wait to see the
talks going on. It should be borne in mind that in 1989 the
OAU gave ANC the green light to have negotiations with the
Pretoria regime. At the 1991 Abuja, Nigeria, member-states
were still torn between opening relations with that country,
but the mood was more for the affirmative. At the same time
there was word that ANC was trying to convince the African
ministers to support lifting sanctions. There are reports
that "... there were whispers in the corridors of the
existence of an unsigned dociament by the ANC calling for a
progressive lifting of sanctions."^’ Whether or not this
is true, the OAU member-countries are weary of their ailing
2°"EC Move on South Africa Curbs Adds to Pressure on
Washington," SASPOST Vol. 2, No. 2 (May 1991): 10.
^’"Out of the OAU, Something New," The Star
(Johannesburg, June 12, 1991), adapted in SASPOST Vol. 4,
No. 2 (September 1991): 10.
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economies, and they want the best for their countries—a
settlement in South Africa may help them, they think.
President de Klerk has already paid state visits to
some of the member-countries of the O.A.U., and since then,
S.A. has announced, trade with Africa increased
considerably. By June 1991 there were signs that Kenya and
some other countries were ready to ease sanctions, and
'•...aircraft of South African Airways are flying over West
Africa...instead of making a detour over the ocean on their
way to and from Europe.Meanwhile Zimbabwe's economic
weakness has forced it to sign trade agreement with S.A.
although it continues to say that sanctions should be left
in place.
Basically, the frontline states have been very shaky in
their stand on sanctions. The general mood is that the
liberation groups in South Africa should ease tensions by
reaching agreement among themselves. Meanwhile O.A.U.
countries will be friends with South Africa—whatever
happened to brotherhood!
Our purpose in this chapter has been to briefly reflect
on the present situation. Starting with the situation
during the seventies, we showed how the internal movements
combined their efforts in resisting the South African
repression. We also indicated that the 1980s was a period
^^ibid.
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when the regime was forced to consider reaching a compromise
with the Africans. While the external influences might have
contributed in that direction, the most pressure was exerted




Findings and "What is to be Done?*'
Mao Tse-tung had a very simplistic explanation of the
importance of fighting. He suggested that peaceful
coexistence would come only when war is declared on another
because, as he put it "... there is only one way to
eliminating it [the war], namely, to oppose war by means of
war...The aim of war lies in eliminating war."^
In 1975 the three Portuguese colonies of Guinea-
Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique achieved their independence
after a long-drawn armed struggle. The settler-colony of
Rhodesia crumbled and gave way to African majority rule.
The resort to the use of force by the Africans in these
territories came after the realization that all political
struggles had borne no positive results. In South Africa
too, the African liberation movements chose armed struggle
as the only option left for them in their quest for freedom
and national independence. However, that objective has not
been achieved. Today South Africa is the only surviving
settler-colonial government on the African continent.
This study has been entrusted with the task of
investigating the drawbacks in the direction of armed
struggle in South Africa as directed by the ANC and PAG.
For this purpose the study followed three developmental
^Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings. 80-81.
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stages: the history of colonization of South Africa and the
reaction of the colonized; the resort to armed struggle and
its limitations; and then the present situation regarding
talks.
The main thrust of our research is in chapter four,
where the factors responsible for the limitation of armed
struggle were detailed.
The fifth chapter gave a brief reflection on the
current political situation in South Africa, and the general
position of the international actors.
Thus far, we have established that the failure of armed
struggle, as our analysis in chapter four discovered,
centers around weak leadership and organization. The
corruption of leaders and personal differences proved lethal
to the survival of these liberation movements. The question
of power struggle has disorganized movements, hence it is
imperative that a strong organization be established so as
to rid the liberation forces of power-hungry elements. It
is unfortunate that the influence of these leaders has not
been curbed as yet.
Therefore, this is reason enough to have a
restructuring of the leadership, and that leadership should
be young as well as politically educated. This
restructuring and education is important among the party
members. The present leadership ought to be flushed out,
and be replaced by a completely new, dynamic one which will
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be able to enforce discipline and recapture the image of the
general liberation movement.
The other problem that the study addressed is lack of
cohesion between the liberation groups. Unity is one of the
primary weapons in winning a liberation war. As we have
seen, the two fighting organizations could not reconcile
their differences and united forces to deal with the common
problems they were faced with. The parochial nature of each
movement has made it impossible for them to forge a national
front. Mao Tse-tung dismissed this behavior, saying that it
represents "infantile disorder", and warns that it must be
discarded because it is counter-revolutionary. According to
Mao, therefore,
the tactic of united front and the
tactic of closed-door sectarianism are
tactics diametrically opposed to each
other. The one is to accximulate large
forces so as to surround [... ] enemies
and annihilate them. The other is to
rely on a single horseman to wage a
desperate fight with a formidable
enemy.^
Therefore, the movements should stop finger-pointing
and bickering and concentrate on matters that bring them
together. The main concern at the moment should not be
ideological differences. What is needed is a strong force
that would be able to match he strength of the South African
regime, politically and militarily.
^Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works. 167.
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The present situation indicates that civil war is
inevitable. The conditions for that war are being
recreated. The mere fact that the forces which are
preparing for "a new South Africa” are deadlocked on the
preliminary steps toward that end is an indication that the
South African regime is buying time. The government is
experienced in this regard. Talks of reform have existed
since the time of Prime Minister John B. Vorster. In the
eighties, President P.W. Botha introduced some reforms, but
while doing so he excluded the Africans from the tricameral
parliament which included Coloureds, Indians and Whites; and
in the 1990s F.W. de Klerk continues with that strategy.
This, as our study discovered, the government has been able
to do because militarily it has not been challenged.
The role of the OAU in the liberation struggle in South
Africa has also been examined. Faced with their own
problems, members of the OAU and the Frontline States, were
not in favor of a sustained war against South Africa. They
have always wished that the opposing forces in South Africa
could settle their domestic problems nonviolently.
The Frontline States cannot afford to host the
liberation movements because of their deteriorating
economies, hence they have encouraged the movements to
negotiate with the racist regime, and as we have seen, some
OAU countries have taken initiative in opening up to South
Africa. Their main concern right now is economic survival;
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and good relations with South, it is hoped, would bolster
their economies.
While the OAU played a most important part in
campaigning for South Africa's isolation by the
international community, its overall strategy for liberation
in Southern Africa as a whole was a dismal failure.
The main question at the moment is: What is to be
done?—and the appropriate answer is that the opportunity
granted the liberation movements by the government should be
used wisely. It is an opportunity to send cadres to the
countryside to begin political education, and create base
areas. The situation now allows that. Education will help
in eradicating fanaticism such as we have seen during the
rebellion of the 1980s. The leaders of the homelands have
also shown that they were tired with the system, and they
have invited the movements to operate in their territories.
As we have indicated above, some homeland leaders have also
made it clear that they would enter into negotiations only
when the government recognized the existence of an African
majority.
In the meantime, there must also be created a strong
underground armed force which will be responsible for the
establishment of base areas. In this way, the liberation
forces will be ready for the coming civil war. For, whether
the liberation movements in South Africa believe it or not,
the dictum that no oppressive power ever relinquishes power
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voluntarily still holds true. The African people must,
therefore, rise up and declare war against the settlers.
The war long declared on them by the racist regime and its
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